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CRAWFORD, RETROACTIVITY, AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN

 
In this Article Professor Sullivan examines the Supreme Court’s evolving Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence through its dramatic return to pre-Sixth Amendment appreciation of the role of cross-
examination in the criminal trial reflected in its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington.  He 
discusses the past quarter century of the Court’s confrontation decisions and their impact on his 
client, Ralph Rodney Earnest, recounting the defendant’s conviction and twenty-four-year litigation 
journey through state and federal courts to his eventual release from prison in the only successful 
attempt to use Crawford retroactively known to date. 
 

Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of 
Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.  This Article is based on the author‘s representation of 
New Mexico defendant Ralph Rodney Earnest from Earnest‘s direct appeal in 1984 through 
dismissal of murder charges resulting in his release from custody on September 5, 2006.  Mr. 
Earnest‘s imprisonment for some twenty-four years reflects both the flexibility of judicial review as a 
vehicle for reassessing legal doctrine and the frustration experienced by individual litigants who 
often suffer significant deprivation of liberty during the process of judicial retrospection.  I want to 
acknowledge the fine work of the New Mexico lawyers with whom I worked on behalf of Mr. 
Earnest throughout this lengthy litigation:  Gary C. Mitchell of Ruidoso, New Mexico, Earnest‘s trial 
counsel, who preserved error and in so doing, ultimately made his release possible, and who 
successfully argued his Crawford-based application for state post-conviction relief in the Eddy 
County District Court; Susan Gibbs, who served as local counsel on direct appeal and later, in federal 
habeas proceedings, after I left the New Mexico Public Defender Department; and Assistant Public 
Defender Sheila Lewis, who served as local appellate counsel in the state post-conviction process.  
The case against Mr. Earnest was dismissed by the district court in Carlsbad, New Mexico, when the 
defense announced it was ready for trial on September 5, 2006, and the State admitted that it could 
not proceed due to the refusal of the key prosecution witness to testify, resulting in the immediate 
release of Earnest from custody.  I also want to acknowledge the excellent editing assistance 
provided by Molly K. Sullivan, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Bowen School of Law, J.D. 
anticipated 2009. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Algernon: The truth is rarely pure and never simple.  Modern 
life would be very tedious if it were either, and modern 
literature a complete impossibility! 
 
Jack: That wouldn‘t be at all a bad thing. 
The Importance of Being Earnest, Act I
1
 
 
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford v. Washington 
represents a rare exercise in appellate decision making because Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, concluded that the Court had erred in previous 
decisions.
2
  He explained: ―[W]e view this as one of those rare cases in which 
the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our 
part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint 
on judicial discretion.‖3  The Crawford Court held that the admission of a 
testimonial statement made by a non-testifying accomplice violates the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause
4
 in the absence of a meaningful 
opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the declarant.
5
  The Crawford 
Court rejected alternative theories for admission of these statements without 
cross-examination despite their presumed inherent reliability.
6
  Moreover, the 
Court‘s rationale also resulted in the exclusion of certain uncrossed hearsay in 
 
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST, reprinted in EIGHT GREAT 
COMEDIES 286, 295 (1958). 
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3. Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖  Id. 
5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (―Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium 
of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.‖) (emphasis added). 
6. See id. at 57.  The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized and applied Crawford in State v. 
Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, 1011 n.1 (N.M. 2004). 
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contexts other than accomplice admissions to police,
7
 significantly altering the 
scope of traditional Confrontation Clause analysis. 
For at least one state court defendant, Ralph Rodney Earnest, Crawford 
was particularly significant because it afforded him relief from a murder 
conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-one and one-half 
years imposed nearly a quarter of a century earlier.
8
  When the New Mexico 
 
7. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4, 826–32 (2006) (holding that a statement 
made by the victim while seeking aid was not testimonial while a statement after the fact was 
testimonial); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an autopsy report 
was a ―business record,‖ not testimony); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 138–40 (Cal. 2007) (finding 
that a DNA report was not testimonial); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 841 (Md. 2006) 
(distinguishing between statements of ―fact‖ and statements of ―opinion‖ in autopsy reports and 
ruling that the latter were testimonial but the former were not); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 
701, 703 (Mass. 2005) (holding that a certificate of lab analysis identifying the nature and quantity of 
substance was not testimonial); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006) (holding 
that a report containing laboratory test analysis was ―testimonial‖ and inadmissible without 
opportunity to cross-examine the analyst); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 639 (N.M. 2004) (holding 
admission of record does not require opportunity for in-court cross-examination of expert who 
conducted test); State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (same); People v. 
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that an autopsy report was a ―business 
record,‖ not testimony); and State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (holding that a police 
lab‘s report of DNA analysis was a ―neutral‖ business record). 
 The issue of application of Crawford to admission of laboratory test reports not offered through 
the expert who conducted the test is before the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.  69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-591 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 3252033.  
Melendez-Diaz was argued in November 2008.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Melendez-Diaz, No. 
07-591. 
 Crawford also opened the door to extensive litigation of confrontation claims within individual 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Dednam v. State, 200 S.W.3d 875, 880–81 (Ark. 2005) (holding no 
confrontation violation where a statement purportedly made by the murder victim to an officer 
concerning another offense was not offered for proof of matter asserted but to show a possible 
motive for the killing); Brown v. State, 238 S.W.3d 614, 618–19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no 
confrontation violation when a child declarant was present at trial and subjected to cross-examination 
regarding the subject of a videotaped deposition); Simmons v. State, 234 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2006) (finding prior deposition testimony elicited in anticipation of civil trial was ―testimonial,‖ 
counsel had opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at deposition with an identical motive for 
cross at trial, and the witness‘s death rendered him unavailable, thus no error in admission of 
deposition testimony); Bogan v. State, No. CACR 05-892, 2006 WL 557128, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 2006) (finding a confrontation claim moot where the appellant did not challenge on appeal 
alternative ground supporting revocation of probation); Wooten v. State, 217 S.W.3d 124, 126–27 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no confrontation violation where a statement was not offered for the 
truth); Sparkman v. State, 208 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a confrontation 
violation in admission of a videotaped statement harmless in light of accused‘s own admission to an 
investigating officer); Vallien v. State, No. CACR 04-985, 2005 WL 2865183, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. 
Nov. 2, 2005) (holding confrontation violation harmless); Hilburn v. State, No. CACR 04-295, 2005 
WL 419499, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2005) (finding no violation where the statement was not 
offered for the truth, but error not preserved). 
8. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005), cert. denied, New Mexico v. 
Forbes, 127 S. Ct. 1482 (2007) (The Honorable Jay Forbes was the district judge who ordered habeas 
relief; the New Mexico attorney general directed its extraordinary writ at the presiding judge, with 
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Supreme Court fashioned a rule affording Earnest relief from that conviction 
based on a limited retroactive application of Crawford,
9
 the court‘s decision 
invariably raised important questions about the retroactivity of United States 
Supreme Court decisions bearing directly on the accuracy of the fact-finding 
process. 
In the Court‘s subsequent decision in Whorton v. Bockting,10 which 
unanimously denied retroactive application of its Crawford holding,
11
 the 
Court held to its bright-line approach to retroactivity imposed in Teague v. 
Lane.
12
  There, a plurality of the Court
13
 had determined that ―new rules‖ of 
constitutional criminal procedure
14
 are subject to retroactive application to 
cases already final only under certain limited circumstances.
15
  Cases are final 
when the defendant has exhausted the direct appeal process through denial of 
a petition for writ of certiorari by the Court.
16
  But cases still pending review 
in the direct appeal process, including consideration of certiorari, are entitled 
to retroactive application of the new rule and its benefits, provided the issue 
 
Earnest being the real party in interest in the case.). 
9. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148–49. 
10. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
11. Id. at 1177. 
12. 489 U.S. 288, 300–01 (1989). 
13. Justice O‘Connor wrote the opinion for a plurality of the Court.  Justice White concurred in 
Parts I, II, and III of the opinion and in the judgment.  Id. at 316 (White, J., concurring).  Justice 
Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), while also concurring in part in a separate opinion written by Justice Stevens, id. 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens specifically noted his agreement with a critical part of 
Justice Brennan‘s dissenting opinion, id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring), in which Justice Marshall 
joined.  Justice Brennan was especially critical of the Court‘s disposition of the case without oral 
argument and full briefing on the dispositive point.  Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  It is 
somewhat difficult to explain how a thinly supported new rule could dominate the Court‘s 
subsequent jurisprudence with respect to the very critical importance of ―new rules‖ in the 
development of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine and for disposition of claims raised by 
individual litigants. 
14. The new rules doctrine does not apply to interpretation of constitutional protections 
regarding substantive rights.  For example, the doctrine does not affect a determination that a statute 
is facially unconstitutional, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453–55 (1939) (holding the 
statute so vague as to fail to afford notice of conduct criminalized); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926), or that a statute is unconstitutionally applied, see United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1994) (holding the statute would constitute a matter of 
substance, not procedure, and thus would not be restricted in its retroactive application).  Similarly, a 
determination that a criminal prosecution infringes on a protected right of expression would involve a 
substantive, not procedural, determination.  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971) 
(involving a conviction based on lewd inscription on clothing protesting the draft). 
15. See infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion of exceptions to the Teague retroactivity doctrine. 
16. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (―By ‗final,‘ we mean a case in 
which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time 
for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.‖). 
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has been properly preserved, consistent with the Court‘s subsequent position 
in Griffith v. Kentucky.
17
 
The Crawford and Bockting litigation also led to an important, previously 
unresolved question of federalism that the Court has now addressed in 
Danforth v. Minnesota
18
 regarding the extent to which state courts are at 
liberty to apply federal constitutional precedent more broadly than required by 
federal due process protections as mandated by the Teague doctrine.
19
  Thus 
far, the New Mexico Supreme Court has been the only state court to fashion a 
retroactive remedy based on Crawford.  And Earnest appears to have been the 
only convicted defendant to have benefited from the Court‘s changed posture 
on confrontation.
20
 
II.  THE CONFRONTATION CONTEXT OF EARNEST 
Had the New Mexico Supreme Court denied relief on Earnest‘s claim for 
the retroactive benefit of Crawford, the case would have served as little more 
than a footnote in the history of Confrontation Clause litigation.  The Earnest 
litigation raised the question now answered by Danforth, upholding the 
autonomy of state courts to fashion remedies for state defendants based on 
newly announced federal constitutional principles.  And, given the emphasis 
on pre-constitutional and constitutional history in Justice Scalia‘s analysis of 
the confrontation claim in Crawford, the little noticed role of Earnest in that 
history deserves mention. 
The Earnest litigation was lengthy.  It included two trials, direct appeal in 
the state court,
21
 argument and reversal on the confrontation issue in the 
United States Supreme Court,
22
 and remand to the state supreme court.
23
  
State
24
 and federal habeas corpus litigation finally concluded some nine years 
 
17. Teague, 489 U.S. at 304–05; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322–23. 
18. 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008). 
19. In Danforth, the Court granted certiorari limited to Question I in the Petition, relating to the 
power of state courts to apply federal constitutional criminal procedure holdings retroactively to state 
inmates or whether they are bound to follow the federal retroactivity doctrine of Teague.  Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 127 S. Ct. 2427 (2007) (granting certiorari in Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 
2006)).  In deciding that Teague does not limit retroactive application of its decisions by state courts, 
the Danforth Court noted the plurality opinion issued in Teague but further observed that Justice 
O‘Connor‘s approach in Teague was subsequently affirmed by a majority of the Court in Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989).  Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1032 n.1. 
20. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005). 
21. See State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985). 
22. See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986). 
23. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), cert. denied, Earnest v. New 
Mexico, 484 U.S. 924 (1987). 
24. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. 
July 9, 1990). 
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before Crawford changed the legal landscape favorably for Earnest‘s case.25  
To appreciate the significance of Crawford and the question of its retroactive 
application for Earnest, now resolved adversely as a matter of federal 
constitutional due process in Bockting,
26
 it is necessary to understand the 
history of the Earnest litigation. 
A.  The Offense and the Prosecution 
Earnest was charged with two co-defendants, Perry Connor and Philip 
Boeglin, in the capital murder of David Eastman in 1982 in Carlsbad, Eddy 
County, New Mexico.
27
  There was no eyewitness to the offense, other than 
Boeglin and Connor.
28
  Connor ultimately testified that Earnest was not 
involved in the murder of Eastman and that he and Boeglin had killed him as 
a result of their belief that Eastman was a drug informant.
29
 
Following the discovery of Eastman‘s body, police were alerted that three 
potential suspects had been observed in Eastman‘s El Camino on the morning 
following his murder.
30
  Police arrested the three, and Boeglin proceeded to 
give a series of statements to investigators on the day of the arrest, one of 
which jointly implicated him, Connor, and another individual he identified as 
―Rob‖ or ―Rod‖ in the commission of Eastman‘s murder.31  In the absence of 
Boeglin‘s statement and the inference that the other individual referred to was 
in fact Earnest, there was no evidence that Earnest had participated in the 
murder and kidnapping offenses. 
 
25. See generally Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Earnest v. 
Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996). 
26. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181 (2007). 
27. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1127; State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 873 (N.M. 1985). 
28. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (N.M. 2005). 
29. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Earnest v. State, CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. 
Oct. 1, 2004); see also State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987).  ―There was no 
physical evidence in the form of fingerprints, blood, or DNA linking Earnest to the murder, even 
though police recovered a handgun used in the killing and the victim was also beaten, which 
suggested the possible splatter of blood onto his assailants.‖  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
supra, at 6; see also Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134. 
 
The State‘s brief accurately summarizes the circumstantial evidence that was 
offered at the second trial.  (N.M. Br. 5–7).  It fails to note, however, (i) that 
Earnest‘s fingerprints were not found on the murder weapon or at the crime 
scene and (ii) that a nitrate test on Earnest‘s hands for gunshot residue was 
negative. 
Brief for the ACLU & the ACLU of N.M. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11 
n.9, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (No. 85-162). 
30. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134. 
31. Id. at 1127, 1134 & n.8. 
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The three co-defendants were charged with first-degree murder, 
conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated kidnapping, and conspiracy to 
commit kidnapping.
32
  Because the prosecution could have alleged 
aggravating circumstances, the murder charge carried a potential death 
sentence.  Earnest was also charged with possession of methamphetamine.
33
  
Connor pleaded guilty in return for a life sentence.
34
  The cases against 
Earnest and Boeglin were severed for trial, and Earnest‘s first trial on the 
charges was terminated by mistrial when Boeglin refused to testify as a 
witness for the State after being granted use immunity for his testimony.
35
 
B.  Conviction, Preservation of Error, and the Direct Appeal 
At Earnest‘s second trial, Boeglin again refused to testify.36  The trial 
court found that Boeglin was unavailable based on his refusal to testify even 
under grant of immunity and threat of contempt.
37
  Based on this finding of 
unavailability, the trial court admitted Boeglin‘s jointly inculpatory statement 
in evidence over Earnest‘s objection.38  Earnest was convicted on all counts 
and appealed his convictions to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
39
 
Earnest‘s claim on direct appeal rested on the issue of whether his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Boeglin‘s 
statement, or whether Boeglin‘s unavailability rendered his statement 
admissible despite the absence of any opportunity for Earnest to test Boeglin‘s 
credibility and the accuracy of the statement through cross-examination.
40
 
1.  Confrontation as Cross-Examination: Douglas v. Alabama 
The Sixth Amendment confrontation right was first made expressly 
applicable in the context of state prosecutions in Pointer v. Texas.
41
  Pointer 
involved the question of admission of sworn, prior testimony given during a 
 
32. Id. at 1127. 
33. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 873 (N.M. 1985). 
34. Petitioner‘s Brief on the Merits at 12, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (No. 
85-162). 
35. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 874–75. 
36. Id. at 875. 
37. Id.  Boeglin was sentenced to a total term of twenty-six years for contempt.  State v. 
Boeglin, 686 P.2d 257, 257–59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).  His contempt conviction was subsequently 
vacated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals.  Id. 
38. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 875.  Boeglin was later tried and convicted despite his testimony that 
police had suppressed evidence supporting his defense of duress in participating in the murder of the 
victim, Eastman.  See State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 950 (N.M. 1987). 
39. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 873; see also State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th. Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 19, 1983) (judgment, sentence, and commitment). 
40. See Earnest I, 703 P.2d. at 873–74. 
41. 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
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preliminary hearing, at which time the accused presumably had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness but without assistance of counsel.
42
  
The Pointer Court rested its holding on existence of an ―adequate 
opportunity‖ for cross-examination.43  Without assistance of counsel, Pointer 
did not have that opportunity, and admission of the witness‘s prior testimony 
at trial was inappropriate in the absence of live testimony and the opportunity 
for cross-examination before the jury.  Consequently, the Court grounded its 
confrontation analysis in the existence of a meaningful opportunity for cross-
examination for the accused at some point in the criminal proceedings.
44
 
On the same day it held in Pointer that the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation protection applied to state proceedings in Pointer, the Court 
also considered the nature of confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama.
45
  The 
constitutional preference for cross-examination was unequivocally 
demonstrated in Douglas when the Court rejected the prosecutor‘s use of an 
accomplice‘s statement as a basis for cross-examining the declarant, who had 
refused to testify at trial.
46
  The prosecutor had simply read the statement 
before the jury over defense counsel‘s objection, asking the uncooperative 
witness to affirm each portion of its contents.
47
  The prosecutor then called 
three law enforcement officers to testify that the statement was in fact made 
by the accomplice, but the statement itself was neither offered nor admitted in 
evidence.
48
  Thus, the prosecutor succeeded in using the statement without the 
defense being afforded any meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the 
accomplice as to the accuracy of the confession or his credibility.
49
 
Douglas signified the Court‘s uncompromising view of the constitutional 
significance of cross-examination as essential to the confrontation guarantee 
until the decision in Ohio v. Roberts,
50
 issued fifteen years after Douglas. 
 
42. Id. at 403. 
43. Id. at 406–08.  Subsequent decisions emphasized the meaningful opportunity for cross-
examination in the evaluation of admissibility of prior testimony.  See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 
204, 213 (1972) (―Before it can be said that Stubbs‘ constitutional right to confront witnesses was not 
infringed, however, the adequacy of Holm‘s examination at the first trial must be taken into 
consideration.‖) (emphasis added); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–68 (1970). 
44. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407–08. 
45. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
46. Id. at 416–17. 
47. Id.  The Court had long recognized, however, that under certain circumstances the 
confrontation right did not necessarily depend upon the opportunity for cross-examination of a 
witness who was not available to testify at trial.  For instance, in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 
140 (1892), the Court recognized the common law rule admitting dying declarations as exceptions to 
the usual requirement for cross-examination based upon their presumed inherent reliability, being 
made under perception of impending death.  Id. at 151. 
48. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 417. 
49. Id. at 419–20. 
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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2.  The Devaluation of Cross-Examination in Ohio v. Roberts 
The Court‘s abrupt shift away from recognition of cross-examination as 
the heart of confrontation served to accommodate common law evidence 
concepts within the Sixth Amendment guarantee.
51
  In Ohio v. Roberts, the 
majority effectively integrated confrontation and principles underlying the 
traditional prohibition against admission of hearsay and, more importantly, its 
many exceptions.
52
  In so doing, the majority introduced a confrontation 
doctrine in which the actual process of confrontation through cross-
examination was itself subject to exception when, in the Court‘s view, cross-
examination seemed unlikely to afford significant benefit in searching for 
truth.
53
 
The factual context of Roberts suggests that the majority unnecessarily 
departed from established principles guiding construction of the confrontation 
guarantee in fashioning the new doctrine ultimately repudiated in Crawford.  
In Roberts, the witness testified at the preliminary hearing, was subjected to 
cross-examination, and was shown to be unavailable to testify at trial despite 
the prosecution‘s diligent efforts to procure her attendance.54 
Consistent with its traditional holdings, the Court could have simply 
reaffirmed the principle that previously cross-examined testimony is generally 
admissible when the prosecution cannot reasonably secure the attendance of 
the witness for trial.
55
  Instead, the Court opened the door to admission of 
uncrossed hearsay by holding that cross-examination before the jury was not 
required if a statement bore sufficient ―indicia of reliability‖ to warrant its 
admission.
56
  The reliability requirement, according to Roberts, was met when 
the statement fell within a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ traditionally 
recognized as justifying admission or the statement had ―particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.‖57 
3.  Disposition of the Direct Appeal in the State Supreme Court 
On direct appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed Earnest‘s 
convictions based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses,
58
 noting his reliance on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision 
 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 66. 
53. See id. at 65–66. 
54. Id. at 58–60. 
55. See id. at 65–66. 
56. Id. at 66. 
57. Id. 
58. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 875–76 (N.M. 1985). 
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in Douglas v. Alabama.
59
  The court rejected the State‘s argument that 
Boeglin‘s statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability for admission without 
cross-examination based on the Supreme Court‘s intervening decision in Ohio 
v. Roberts.
60
  In setting aside the defendant‘s conviction in Earnest, the court 
affirmed the preference for cross-examination in the presence of the jury at 
trial in concluding: 
 
Boeglin‘s prior statement made to police officers shortly after 
his arrest was not made during the course of any judicial 
proceeding and defendant was in no way afforded an 
opportunity to cross-examine Boeglin.  We therefore 
determine that admission of Boeglin‘s prior statement was 
highly prejudicial, violated defendant‘s confrontation rights, 
and deprived defendant of meaningful cross-examination.
61
 
 
Thus, the court concluded not only that Earnest‘s convictions rested on 
constitutional error, but also that the error was prejudicial, requiring 
reversal.
62
  However, the court rejected Earnest‘s prior jeopardy claim based 
on the trial court‘s declaration of mistrial when Boeglin refused to testify at 
the first trial.
63
  Instead, because trial counsel had objected to the trial court‘s 
aggressive efforts to force Boeglin to testify against his client, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court held that Earnest had invited the mistrial and thus 
could not plead prior jeopardy as a bar to the retrial, despite the trial court‘s 
express withdrawal of his mistrial motions.
64
 
C.  New Mexico v. Earnest: The United States Supreme Court Weighs In 
Following the reversal of Earnest‘s conviction on direct appeal, the 
attorney general successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for 
certiorari.
65
  After hearing oral argument, the Court vacated the judgment of 
 
59. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
60. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  The Earnest I 
court relied on the Tenth Circuit‘s application of Roberts in United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462, 
465 (10th Cir. 1981), limiting the application of the Roberts rationale to instances in which the 
prosecution offered prior testimony that had been subjected to cross-examination, a formulation 
correctly anticipating Crawford.  Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876. 
61. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 874. 
64. See id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 485 (1971)).  The supreme court ruled that counsel was admonished by the trial court that 
his motions for mistrial risked termination of proceedings that might otherwise have resulted in 
acquittal because of insufficient evidence.  Id.  The court then concluded that trial counsel failed to 
withdraw his motions prior to declaration of a mistrial.  Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 874–85. 
65. New Mexico v. Earnest, 474 U.S. 918 (1985). 
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the New Mexico Supreme Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in 
light of its just-issued decision in Lee v. Illinois.
66
  Concurring, then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and 
O‘Connor, observed that Lee overruled Douglas v. Alabama by implication,67 
adopting the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts.
68
  In Roberts, the Court ruled that 
the Confrontation Clause does not always require cross-examination at trial by 
holding that admission of preliminary hearing testimony subject to cross-
examination would be admissible in the event of the declarant‘s unavailability 
to testify at trial.
69
 
In Lee, the Court extended the ―indicia of reliability‖ test articulated in 
Roberts to include jointly inculpatory statements made by accomplices to 
police.
70
  Thus, Justice Rehnquist observed that after Lee, state courts could 
admit statements of non-testifying co-defendants assuming that the 
prosecution could ―overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability 
attaching to [those] statements by demonstrating that the particular statement 
at issue bears sufficient ‗indicia of reliability‘ to satisfy Confrontation Clause 
concerns.‖71  But significantly, the Lee majority did not hold that the 
accomplice‘s statement was properly admitted, and Lee was afforded relief 
from the conviction.
72
 
On remand from the order vacating its judgment for reconsideration in 
light of Lee, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Earnest‘s 
convictions.
73
  In so doing, it followed Justice Rehnquist‘s lead and concluded 
that Boeglin‘s statement to the police demonstrated sufficient indicia of 
reliability to warrant admission despite his unavailability for cross-
examination.
74
  The primary basis for its decision was its characterization of 
Boeglin‘s statement as a declaration against his penal interest75 because it 
 
66. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 648 (1986); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
67. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
68. Id. at 649–50; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
69. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68–70.  The burden of establishing the unavailability of the witness 
must be borne by the prosecution.  See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722–25 (1968). 
70. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 543–44. 
71. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649–50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
72. Lee, 476 U.S. at 546–47.  The state courts had concluded that the ―interlocking‖ nature of 
statements given to police by the defendant and the accomplice rendered the statement sufficiently 
reliable to warrant its admission without the accused being afforded an opportunity to test its 
credibility by cross-examination.  Id. at 538–39.  An equally divided Court in Parker v. Randolph, 
442 U.S. 62 (1979), had suggested that the interlocking confessions of the accused and co-defendant 
avoided the harm of admission of a co-defendant‘s uncrossed confession deemed so prejudicial as to 
defy cure by admonition in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).  See Parker, 442 U.S. 
at 72–73. 
73. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 541 (N.M. 1987). 
74. Id. at 540. 
75. Curiously, the court never addressed the text or applicability of the state‘s evidence rule 
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exposed him to prosecution for a capital crime and a potential death 
sentence.
76
 
The state court also found that Boeglin‘s statement was reliable because it 
was corroborated by evidence of the offense itself, noting: 
 
[T]here was independent evidence presented at trial which 
substantially corroborated Boeglin‘s description of events 
surrounding the murder.  For example: Boeglin‘s description 
of a drug deal involving fourteen grams of methamphetamine 
was corroborated by Michael Blount; Boeglin‘s description of 
the accomplices‘ belief that the victim was an informant was 
corroborated by Dana Boeglin; Boeglin‘s description of an 
attempt to kill the victim with an overdose of 
methamphetamine was corroborated by the testimony of a 
toxicologist; and Boeglin‘s description of where the gun used 
to kill the victim was hidden led to recovery of the gun.  In 
sum, Boeglin‘s statement bore sufficient independent indicia 
of reliability to rebut the weighty presumption of 
unreliability; the trial court therefore did not err in admitting 
it into evidence.
77
 
 
None of these corroborating facts, however, rendered the statement credible 
with regard to allegations concerning the involvement of other individuals, 
Connor and ―Rod‖ or ―Rob‖—as Boeglin had identified the other participant 
in the crime.
78
 
Later in Idaho v. Wright,
79
 the Supreme Court held that where hearsay 
statements are admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule and without 
opportunity for cross-examination, the ―indicia of reliability‖ justifying 
admission may not include evidence corroborating the factual contents of the 
 
governing admission of declarations against penal interest: 
 
(3) Statement against interest.  A statement which was at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant‘s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a 
claim by the declarant against another that a reasonable person in the declarant‘s 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.  A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
N.M. R. EVID. 11-804(B)(3). 
76. Earnest II, 744 P.2d at 540. 
77. Id. 
78. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996). 
79. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
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statement.
80
  That limitation, as applied to Boeglin‘s statement, is obvious.  
Accomplice statements are considered inherently suspect due to the 
accomplice‘s self-interest,81 which may be promoted by cooperating with 
authorities or, more aggressively, by supplying information sought by 
authorities that may not be truthful.
82
  The fact that evidence surrounding the 
offense corroborated aspects of Boeglin‘s statement merely demonstrated that 
he was more than likely involved in the offense himself; it did not 
demonstrate Earnest‘s guilt.  In Wright, the Court confirmed this approach in 
ruling that ―hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia 
of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other 
evidence at trial.‖83 
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
Boeglin sought leverage from police in giving the inculpatory statement, it 
focused on objective factors rather than considering Boeglin‘s state of mind or 
apparent motive.
84
  The court concluded that his statement was reliable 
―because the colloquy between Boeglin and the investigating officers 
reflect[ed] the fact that Boeglin was not offered any leniency in exchange for 
his statement.‖85  Thus, because officers told Boeglin he could not expect 
leniency, the court found that his statement was not motivated by hope of 
gaining leniency, something that could never be discerned from the officers‘ 
 
80. Id. at 823. 
81. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 
(1987) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that such statements ―have traditionally been viewed with 
special suspicion‖); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
136 (1968) (concluding that such statements are ―inevitably suspect‖). 
82. A particularly poignant story reflecting the self-interest of a suspect implicating another 
individual involves the confession by Christopher Ochoa, who admitted to a rape and murder he did 
not commit, and his implication of a friend, Richard Danziger, in the same crime.  Diane Jennings, A 
Shaken System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 24, 2008, at 1A.  Ochoa was motivated by fear of the 
death penalty.  Id.  Some twelve years after both men were convicted and sentenced to life terms, 
they were exonerated by the confession of another individual whose responsibility was corroborated 
by DNA evidence.  Id.  Ochoa testified against Danziger at trial, later admitting that he lied under 
oath in order to obtain the life sentence promised in return for his own plea of guilty.  Id.  Both men 
were ultimately released on the basis of the true killer‘s confession made in a letter to the Travis 
County, Texas, district attorney and the recovery of DNA evidence demonstrating that this 
confession was accurate.  Id.  Ochoa completed his education, including graduating from the 
University of Wisconsin School of Law, the institution whose Innocence Project had championed the 
case, and now practices criminal law.  Id.  Danziger, however, was assaulted in prison, suffering a 
severe brain injury that has left him permanently impaired and living with assistance paid for from 
the settlement of his civil suit against the City of Austin and Travis County.  Id. 
83. 497 U.S. at 822. 
84. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987). 
85. Id. 
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statements to the contrary since it involved Boeglin‘s perception rather than 
objective facts.
86
 
Indeed, before giving the inculpatory statement, Boeglin explained to the 
detectives: ―I was hoping I could make some kind of deal.‖87  At this point, 
the detectives advised that they would not offer him any deal for his 
cooperation.
88
  Based on objective facts, the court concluded that Boeglin had 
no reasonable expectation of ―mak[ing] some kind of deal‖ with officers.89  
But the critical issue in determining the credibility of the statement should not 
have been whether Boeglin could have made a deal by cooperating with 
authorities, but more accurately, whether he thought he could have.  Having 
indicated his interest in making a deal, one could question whether there was 
any reasonable explanation for his subsequent disclosures since his expression 
of interest in making a deal undermined any reasonable inference that he 
confessed to expiate guilt. 
Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s factual conclusion was 
controlling on this point and binding on subsequent federal habeas corpus 
review.
90
 
D.  Earnest in Post-Conviction 
Following affirmance of his conviction on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court, Earnest turned to state
91
 and federal avenues
92
 for post-
conviction relief. 
1.  Earnest‘s State Constitutional Claim in State Habeas Corpus93 
Initially, Earnest filed an application for state post-conviction relief, 
urging the state courts to consider his claim that Boeglin‘s statement had been 
improperly admitted without cross-examination in light of the confrontation 
protection afforded by the New Mexico Constitution.
94
  This claim had been 
included in the original direct appeal but not argued aggressively as an 
 
86. See id. 
87. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996). 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. Deference to state court fact-finding by federal habeas courts is mandated by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) (2000), including facts found by state appellate courts.  See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 
545–46 (1981). 
91. New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts 5-802G currently provides 
a state post-conviction remedy for New Mexico inmates challenging their state court convictions. 
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) creates a statutory federal habeas corpus remedy for state court 
inmates claiming violations of federal constitutional rights in state court proceedings. 
93. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 2. 
94. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14, cl. 3 (―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖). 
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alternative ground for relief.
95
  The New Mexico Supreme Court‘s reversal of 
Earnest‘s conviction based on Douglas rendered the state constitutional 
argument moot, of course.
96
  Although on remand the court noted the 
excellent briefs and oral arguments of both parties, it did not address the state 
constitutional claim in its opinion affirming Earnest‘s conviction.97 
In his initial application for state habeas relief, Earnest argued that 
because New Mexico courts had traditionally interpreted the state 
constitutional confrontation guarantee as coextensive with cross-
examination,
98
 the relaxed standard for Sixth Amendment confrontation 
recognized in Ohio v. Roberts would not overcome the state law protection.
99
  
New Mexico precedent consistently described the right of confrontation as 
securing to the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses.
100
  Historically, 
cross-examination had been a core state constitutional value.
101
  In Valles v. 
State, the court of appeals observed that federal constitutional interpretation is 
instructive in providing guidance to construction of state constitutional 
protections, but it did not hold that federal interpretation would bind state 
interpretation or control the parameters of the right.
102
 
Thus, Earnest relied on New Mexico decisions establishing an unbroken 
line of authority that recognized cross-examination as the core of the 
confrontation guarantee under the state constitution,
103
 prior to the Supreme 
Court‘s reversal in New Mexico v. Earnest.104  On remand, the state supreme 
court elected to follow the lead of Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence
105
 and 
 
95. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state court decision resting on an 
―adequate and independent‖ state law ground precludes consideration of a federal constitutional 
claim.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983). 
96. See State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985). 
97. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987).  In the brief on remand, the 
author argued vigorously that the state court should consider Earnest‘s reliance on the New Mexico 
constitutional confrontation protection as an alternative basis for review.  Brief for 
Defendant/Appellant on Remand at 2, Earnest II, 744 P.2d 539 (No. 15,162).  Regardless of what the 
court may have thought about the quality of briefing, it did not discuss the state constitutional analog 
to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in affirming the conviction. 
98. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24; see State v. James, 415 P.2d 350, 352 
(N.M. 1966). 
99. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 1996). 
100. See, e.g., James, 415 P.2d at 352. 
101. See State v. Martin, 209 P.2d 525, 527 (N.M. 1949); State v. Jackson, 233 P. 49, 52 (N.M. 
1924); Territory v. Ayers, 113 P. 604, 605 (N.M. 1910); Valles v. State, 563 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1977), cert. denied, 567 P.2d 486 (N.M. 1977); State v. Sparks, 512 P.2d 1265, 1266 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1973); State v. Holly, 445 P.2d 393, 395 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968). 
102. 563 P.2d at 613. 
103. State v. Martinez, 623 P.2d 565, 568 (N.M. 1981). 
104. 477 U.S. 648 (1986). 
105. Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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supplanted cross-examination with the indicia of reliability test
106
 articulated 
in Roberts
107
 and used in Lee v. Illinois.
108
 
New Mexico has recognized that the state constitution may afford litigants 
in state proceedings greater protection than that provided for by comparable 
federal constitutional guarantees.
109
  Ten years after its affirmance on remand 
in Earnest II, the state supreme court adopted the ―interstitial approach‖ to 
evaluation of state constitutional law claims in State v. Gomez.
110
 
The interstitial approach adopted by the Gomez court recognized that state 
constitutional protections may be interpreted more broadly than their federal 
constitutional counterparts in certain circumstances, including those situations 
in which the federal guarantee suffers from flawed analysis.
111
  In adopting 
this approach, New Mexico rejected the lock-step alternative in which state 
constitutional guarantees are construed as co-extensive with comparable 
federal constitutional protections.
112
  The Gomez court also held that 
preservation of the state constitutional claim was sufficient for appeals if the 
state constitutional provision relied upon is expressly raised by the litigant.
113
 
Despite Earnest‘s reference to Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico 
Constitution in his original brief on direct appeal
114
 and his express reliance 
on state constitutional confrontation protection as an alternative theory for 
relief in arguing the case on remand from the Supreme Court and in his first 
application for post-conviction relief,
115
 the state courts consistently refused to 
address the argument that admission of Boeglin‘s statement without cross-
examination violated protections afforded by the state charter.
116
  Following 
its denial of relief on the post-conviction petition by the trial court,
117
 the 
supreme court denied Earnest‘s petition for writ of certiorari to review that 
action.
118
 
 
106. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987). 
107. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
108. 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986). 
109. See, e.g., State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 803 (N.M. 1996) (recognizing greater due process 
protection afforded by the state constitution where litigation was tainted by prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
110. 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 6. 
113. Id. at 8. 
114. Brief in Chief at 19, 23, State v. Earnest, No. 15,162 (N.M. Mar. 21, 1984). 
115. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24. 
116. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987); State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 
703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985). 
117. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 29, 1990) (order denying 
petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
118. Earnest v. State, No. 19,545 (N.M. Oct. 17, 1990) (order denying petition for writ of 
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2.  Earnest‘s Federal Habeas Litigation 
Thwarted in the state courts, Earnest petitioned for federal habeas relief,
119
 
arguing that the state court had improperly applied Lee in holding that 
Boeglin‘s confession was properly admitted at trial.120  In Lee, the Supreme 
Court did not hold that accomplice confessions were admissible per se or that 
they necessarily fell within a deeply rooted exception to the hearsay rule.
121
  
In fact, the Court reversed in Lee, finding that the accomplice statement was 
not properly admitted and rejecting the argument that its ―interlocking‖ 
content—tending to corroborate much of Lee‘s own statement to police—
rendered it reliable.
122
  Moreover, with respect to accomplice statements, the 
Lee Court stressed that these statements are presumptively unreliable,
123
 
requiring the proponent to demonstrate particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness to sustain the burden for admission without opportunity for 
cross-examination.
124
 
But the magistrate judge held that the state court had found particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness in Boeglin‘s inculpation of himself in a capital 
crime and concluded that he did not make the statement in an effort to shift 
blame to his accomplices.
125
  And the magistrate judge concurred in the state 
court‘s conclusion while expressly not considering the factual corroboration 
linking Boeglin to the offense to which he confessed in the reliability 
analysis.
126
  Thus, the federal habeas court agreed with the state court‘s 
conclusion that Boeglin‘s statement was sufficiently reliable to have been 
 
certiorari). 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) affords state court defendants the option of pursuing violations of 
federal constitutional rights in state proceedings by petitioning for habeas relief in the federal district 
courts, provided the claims have previously been exhausted in available state proceedings.  See 
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275–76 (2005) (Federal habeas corpus may order litigation held in 
abeyance pending exhaustion of available state remedies when necessary to prevent dismissal of 
petition barring consideration of colorable federal claims on the merits.); O‘Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 
U.S. 838, 847–48 (1999) (Exhaustion requirement extends to require defendant to exhaust 
discretionary remedies available in state process, even if state court policy discourages litigation.); 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516–17, 519 (1982) (Federal habeas petition containing both claims 
that have been previously presented and decided by state courts and claims that have not previously 
been presented to state courts are ―mixed‖ petitions that must be dismissed to afford petitioner 
opportunity to exhaust available state remedies.). 
120. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 1996). 
121. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
122. Id. at 545–46. 
123. Id. at 541. 
124. Id. at 543. 
125. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1131–32. 
126. Id. at 1132. 
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admitted without Earnest being afforded an opportunity for cross-examination 
while using a more restrictive formula for reaching its conclusion.
127
 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that an accomplice‘s inculpatory 
statement to police, such as Boeglin‘s, fell within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception and thus was admissible without cross-examination based on that 
theory of reliability under Roberts.
128
  But the circuit court agreed with the 
federal habeas court that Boeglin‘s statement carried sufficient indicia of 
reliability based upon the facts that guaranteed its trustworthiness.
129
  
Earnest‘s federal habeas litigation ended in 1996 when the Supreme Court 
again denied his petition for certiorari challenging the state court‘s application 
of Roberts and Lee to the admission of Boeglin‘s statement at trial.130 
III.  CRAWFORD: RESTORATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION AS THE KEY TO 
CONFRONTATION 
Earnest‘s confrontation claim remained dormant until the Supreme Court 
reversed the Washington Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington in 
2004.
131
 
Crawford involved the admission of a co-defendant‘s statement to police 
without the defendant being afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant on the statement‘s contents or the circumstances under which the 
statement was given.
132
  Michael Crawford was charged with the murder of an 
individual he believed had tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.
133
  He and Sylvia 
both gave statements to police that diverged on potentially important points 
concerning his motivation for the fatal assault.
134
  In his statement to police, 
 
127. Id. at 1133. 
128. Id. at 1131 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5).  The circuit court explained, ―Although it is a 
statement against penal interest, cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), the Supreme Court has held that in this 
context that hearsay exception ‗defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause 
analysis.‘‖  Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1131. 
129. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134. 
130. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996). 
131. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The procedural context of Crawford is 
significant because the Supreme Court heard the case following affirmance of Crawford‘s direct 
appeal in the state court.  See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002).  Under the Teague new 
rules doctrine, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), the Court is restricted in announcing a 
change in interpretation of constitutional criminal procedure rules, and generally new procedural 
rules cannot be recognized in the federal habeas process.  See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396–
97 (1994). 
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 38–40.  The facts of the case suggest the same troubling scenario that provides the 
compelling plot of Otto Preminger‘s classic film, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959), the 
best criminal law movie ever made.  The film was based on the novel of the same title, authored by 
former Michigan Supreme Court Justice John Donaldson Voelker, writing under the pen name 
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Michael claimed that he went to confront the victim, a fight ensued, and he 
stabbed the victim in self-defense.
135
 
At trial, the prosecution offered Sylvia‘s statement, which deviated from 
Michael‘s claim of self-defense.136  Contrary to Michael‘s account, Sylvia 
denied having seen a weapon in the victim‘s hand during the fight.137  Despite 
the fact that spousal privilege barred the prosecution from calling Sylvia as a 
witness, Washington law permitted admission of her out-of-court statement to 
police as a declaration against her penal interest.
138
  Because Sylvia admitted 
that she led her husband to the victim‘s apartment, the state trial court ruled 
that her statement implicated her as a party to the assault and consequently 
fell within the exception for statements against the declarant‘s penal 
interest.
139
 
Michael‘s trial counsel objected to admission of the statement, but the 
state court found the statement sufficiently reliable to warrant admission in 
the absence of cross-examination.
140
  The prosecutor argued in closing that 
Sylvia‘s statement was ―damning evidence‖ contradicting Michael‘s claim of 
self-defense, and the jury convicted.
141
 
A.  Crawford in Context 
The legal landscape of confrontation changed dramatically in the Supreme 
Court‘s decisions from Douglas in 1965 through Roberts‘s and Lee‘s 
diminution of cross-examination as a critical component in the confrontation 
construct.  The changed landscape after Crawford reflected an aberration in 
the traditional view of confrontation of the most troubling out-of-court 
statements as grounded in the opportunity for cross-examination.  A 
 
―Robert Traver.‖  ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).  For more on Justice Voelker, 
see Eileen Kavanagh, Robert Traver as Justice Voelker—The Novelist as Judge, 10 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 91 (2005). 
135. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–40. 
136. Id. at 39–40. 
137. Id. 
138. WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
139. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
140. Id.  The Court summarized the trial court‘s views of Sylvia‘s statement as a declaration 
against her interest: 
 
The trial court here admitted the statement . . . offering several reasons why it 
was trustworthy: Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather corroborating her 
husband‘s story that he acted in self-defense or ―justified reprisal‖; she had 
direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she 
was being questioned by a ―neutral‖ law enforcement officer. 
Id. 
141. Id. at 40–41. 
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consideration of the landscape demonstrates that the Court‘s departure from 
cross-examination as a primary concern in Roberts and Lee was neither well-
grounded in history
142
 nor suggestive of a true commitment to the new 
doctrine in which reliability analysis supplanted the cross-examination 
process as primary in consideration for admission of all hearsay. 
In light of the Roberts and Lee confrontation formulation, admission of 
Sylvia‘s statement against Michael at trial was arguably consistent with the 
Court‘s compromise of the traditional notion of confrontation as 
fundamentally coextensive with the opportunity for cross-examination.  Under 
Roberts and Lee, either of two operating premises supported admission of her 
statement to police and the consequent conviction.
143
  Sylvia‘s statement was 
either admissible because it reflected a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay 
rule or because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability such that its credibility 
or inherent truthfulness could be fairly inferred without the necessity for 
testing by cross-examination.
144
 
In assessing the existing legal landscape of confrontation, it is important 
to note two distinct lines of thought that would coalesce in Crawford: the 
traditional suspicion with which statements made by accomplices to police 
have been viewed because of the declarant‘s acknowledged self-interest in 
spreading blame or attempting to negotiate for leniency, and the historical 
understanding that testimonial statements offered to incriminate the accused 
in a criminal trial must be tested by cross-examination.  In Crawford, these 
two considerations undermined the credibility of the Court‘s approach in 
Roberts and Lee, at least when addressing the lack of cross-examination in 
factually similar contexts. 
1.  Confrontation and the Jury: Coy v. Iowa 
The Court‘s liberalized approach to confrontation evident in Roberts and 
Lee did not reflect a consensus that all presumably reliable out-of-court 
statements should be admitted without testing by cross-examination.  Even in 
these decisions, the majority demanded that the prosecution demonstrate the 
unavailability of the declarant and its diligence in attempting to secure the 
presence of the witness for trial.
145
 
 
142. Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 
(1965), with Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
143. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
144. See id. 
145. For example, in the wake of Pointer, the Court held in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723–
25 (1968), that prior testimony from a co-defendant taken when the accused was represented by 
counsel would be admissible in the co-defendant‘s absence from trial only where the prosecution 
demonstrated due diligence in attempting to procure his attendance to testify before the jury.  The co-
defendant was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in Texas at the time of Barber‘s trial in 
252 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:231 
Viewing admission of uncrossed out-of-court statements as justifiable 
only in circumstances in which the witness could not be produced for 
testimony before the jury, the majority continued to press for reasonableness 
in reliance on the exception to the preferred procedure of offering testimony 
before the jury where it would be tested by cross-examination.
146
  This is 
because the confrontation guarantee embraces not only the concept of testing 
for the opportunity to question the witness but also the value of having jurors 
assess the credibility of responses given based on observation of the witness 
during the cross-examination.
147
  The Court had fully explained the function 
of cross-examination in California v. Green,
148
 where the majority explained 
that confrontation at trial is significant because it forces the witness to testify 
under oath and penalty of perjury; ensures the opportunity for cross-
examination, affording the accused the best available means to test the 
accuracy of the testimony; and does so in the presence of jurors, allowing 
them to consider the witness‘s demeanor in making a determination as to his 
credibility.
149
 
Later, in Coy v. Iowa,
150
 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in reiterating 
the constitutional preference for face-to-face confrontation between the 
accused and the witnesses against him in the presence of the jury: ―We have 
never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of 
fact.‖151 
Even the Roberts Court had conceded the constitutional preference for 
face-to-face confrontation: ―The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation 
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial . . . .‖152 
But Coy, while not overruled, was significantly limited in Maryland v. 
Craig,
153
 where a different majority concluded that the policy interest in 
protecting minor children from the trauma of testifying in open court before 
the jury in child abuse cases justified alternative procedures for eliciting 
 
Oklahoma, id. at 720, and the record showed that the prosecution had not taken appropriate steps to 
procure his presence at trial, id. at 723. 
146. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 545; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. 
147. Lee, 476 U.S. at 540 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)); Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 63–64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895)). 
148. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
149. Id. at 158. 
150. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
151. Id. at 1016. 
152. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (―[I]t is this 
literal right to ‗confront‘ the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered 
by the Confrontation Clause.‖)). 
153. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
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testimony.
154
  While the Court did not dispense with face-to-face 
confrontation between these witnesses and the accused, as the Iowa 
procedure—employing a screen in the courtroom to prevent children from 
having to observe their alleged abusers—had, the Court approved procedures 
to remove the cross-examination from the immediate presence of jurors.
155
  
Thus, videotaped depositions and testimony by closed-circuit television may 
supplant direct confrontation in the courtroom before the jury, if necessary to 
prevent further trauma to the child from testifying before strangers.
156
 
Nevertheless, the underlying proposition that direct confrontation during 
the cross-examination process remained the preferred model for ensuring the 
accused‘s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him 
continued to require that significant policy interests be demonstrated before 
that model was rendered inapplicable.  One of those interests, of course, is the 
public‘s legitimate expectation for prosecution despite the unavailability of a 
key prosecution witness. 
2.  Accomplice Declarations as Inherently Suspect: Lee v. Illinois 
The Supreme Court reversed Lee‘s conviction based on the admission of 
her co-defendant‘s statement to police that inculpated both of them.157  The 
declarant, Lee‘s boyfriend, Thomas, was unavailable to testify because he 
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.
158
  Assuming that declarations 
against the penal interests of declarants are generally trustworthy and thus 
admissible under Ohio v. Roberts—despite the fact that the contents of the 
statement cannot be tested by cross-examination—the reversal in Lee must 
have been predicated on something in the nature of the particular declarant‘s 
status as an accomplice or the statement itself. 
The critical factors that supported the reversal included the non-testifying 
accomplice‘s generic status as an accomplice in the commission of the 
crime.
159
  The Court observed: ―Over the years since Douglas, the Court has 
spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices‘ 
confessions that incriminate defendants.‖160  This same concern, that an 
accomplice‘s accusation is ―presumptively suspect‖ because of the possibility 
that the declarant has something to gain by implicating another,
161
 was 
 
154. Id. at 853. 
155. See id. at 851. 
156. Id. at 853–55. 
157. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546–47 (1986). 
158. See id. at 536.  The trials were severed and neither defendant testified except at hearings 
on their respective motions to suppress their confessions.  Id. 
159. See id. at 541. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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certainly evident in Boeglin‘s statement that arguably implicated Earnest, in 
which Boeglin stated his interest in making a deal in return for his cooperation 
with authorities.
162
  Yet, while the admission of Thomas‘s statement as 
substantive evidence against Lee required reversal, according to the majority, 
the same Court vacated Earnest‘s reversal, setting in motion the twenty-year 
history of Earnest‘s incarceration following the remand of the case to the state 
court and the consequent reinstatement of his conviction.
163
 
Second, the statement made by Thomas differed significantly from Lee‘s, 
particularly in his admission that they had discussed the killing of Lee‘s aunt 
prior to the fatal attack.
164
  Lee claimed that Thomas had first stabbed her 
aunt‘s friend, apparently angered by a look the friend had given them,165 
which led Lee‘s aunt to attack Lee.  Lee claimed that she stabbed her aunt in 
self-defense.
166
  Thomas confessed after being informed that Lee had already 
given a statement, and she ―implored‖ him to share blame for the offense. 167  
Thus, the circumstances under which Thomas gave his statement undermined 
the suggested particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for 
admission of an accomplice‘s statement as a declaration against penal 
interest.
168
 
In fact, the Lee majority pointed to those factors in rejecting reliance on 
her accomplice‘s confession to establish the degree of Lee‘s guilt.169  The 
same factors, present in Earnest, undermined Justice Rehnquist‘s reasoning in 
his concurrence in New Mexico v. Earnest.
170
  Moreover, prior to the Court‘s 
reconsideration of Roberts in Crawford, the lack of appreciation for the 
significance of the Lee factors tainted the Roberts rationale‘s application to 
convictions based on accomplice statements to police. 
The Lee majority specifically held that accomplice statements do not fall 
within a general exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against interest 
 
162. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996). 
163. See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).  The Lee majority recognized not only 
the traditional suspicion with which accomplice statements are viewed, but also the inherently strong 
prejudice that attends the fact of the confession itself.  476 U.S. at 542.  The Lee Court looked to its 
earlier holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–36 (1968), where it concluded that the 
jointly inculpatory aspect of an accomplice‘s confession constituted such powerful evidence that 
jurors could not be expected to disregard its use as evidence of the accused‘s guilt when admitted 
only against the co-defendant declarant, regardless of the strength of the trial court‘s admonitions that 
jurors not consider the confession in determining guilt.  Lee, 476 U.S. at 542. 
164. Lee, 476 U.S. at 534–35. 
165. Id. at 533. 
166. See id. at 534. 
167. Id. at 544. 
168. Id. at 543–44. 
169. Id. at 544. 
170. See 477 U.S. 648, 649 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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but actually constituted a far narrower category.
171
  Nevertheless, while Lee 
obtained a reversal, the majority‘s reiteration of the Roberts rationale for 
admissibility permitted Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence in New Mexico 
v. Earnest, to set in motion the liberalization of admission of accomplice 
statements signaling that lower courts could rely on Roberts as a theoretical 
justification for admission of statements falling within the narrower class of 
inherently suspect statements.
172
 
The Lee majority also rejected two additional arguments advanced for 
admission of the accomplice‘s statement without the opportunity for cross-
examination at trial.  First, the significant differences in the content of the two 
statements rebutted the claim that they were interlocking, and thus the 
reliability of Thomas‘s statement was established by references to the 
admissions made by Lee in her own statement.
173
  Of course, the prosecution 
offered Thomas‘s statement precisely because it diverged from Lee‘s 
admissions on the factual question of whether she was truly justified in killing 
her aunt or, in fact, had planned the murder with Thomas.  Second, because 
the issue at the hearing was the voluntariness of the statements rather than 
their accuracy, the fact that Lee‘s counsel was afforded an opportunity to 
cross-examine Thomas during the joint hearing on their motions to suppress 
their respective statements did not afford Lee a meaningful opportunity to 
cross Thomas.
174
 
The vacation of Earnest‘s reversal by the New Mexico Supreme Court and 
remand for reconsideration in light of Lee should never have led to Earnest‘s 
continued incarceration through the substantial unsuccessful litigation prior to 
the state court‘s retroactive application of Crawford in his case.  Lee‘s 
reversal was ordered on far less compelling facts, particularly in light of the 
fact that Lee herself had confessed, implicating herself in the offense, in 
contrast to Earnest, who never confessed to police and testified at trial—being 
subjected to cross-examination—that he was not involved in the offense at all. 
3.  Reconsidering ―Penal Interest‖: Williamson v. United States 
Admission of accomplice statements continued to earn the Court‘s focus 
after Lee and New Mexico v. Earnest.  In Williamson v. United States,
175
 the 
Court considered the admission of out-of-court statements made by non-
testifying accomplices in light of the exception to the hearsay rule for 
 
171. Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5. 
172. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist J., concurring). 
173. Lee, 476 U.S. at 546. 
174. Id. at 546 n.6. 
175. 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
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statements contrary to the declarant‘s penal interest.176  Later, in Lilly v. 
Virginia,
177
 the majority returned to the admissibility of accomplice 
statements not subjected to testing by cross-examination.
178
  Both decisions 
suggest uneasiness with the overreaching engaged in by the Roberts Court in 
adopting a model for resolution of admissibility questions in which 
assumptions made about the reliability of statements against penal interest 
supplanted the strict requirement that the accused have a meaningful 
opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.
179
 
Significantly, Williamson was not predicated on the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation guarantee, but the decision did suggest a retreat from the rather 
open-ended approach to reliability assumptions as a substitute for cross-
examination in the admission of accomplice statements.
180
  The majority 
noted that the reference to the declarant‘s ―statement‖ in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(b)(3) could have both expansive and narrow meanings.
181
 
The expansive reading of the accomplice‘s statement would provide that 
the entirety of a statement made by an accomplice inculpating himself would 
be admissible, while the narrow view would authorize admission of only those 
parts of a statement that were in fact self-inculpatory.
182
  The majority 
distinguished between those portions of a statement that are truly self-
inculpatory and thus might demonstrate the assumed reliability underlying the 
rationale of the exception to the hearsay rule and those that are not necessarily 
self-inculpatory, including assertions regarding the culpability of others.
183
  
The Court reversed based on the admission of the entirety of the statement 
made by Harris implicating Williamson, holding: 
 
[W]e cannot conclude that all that Harris said was properly 
admitted.  Some of Harris‘ confession would clearly have 
been admissible under Rule 804(b)(3); for instance, when he 
said he knew there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially 
forfeited his only possible defense to a charge of cocaine 
possession, lack of knowledge.  But other parts of his 
confession, especially the parts that implicated Williamson, 
did little to subject Harris himself to criminal liability.  A 
 
176. Id. at 598–605; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (―statement[s] which . . . at the time of [their] 
making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person 
in the declarant‘s position would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to be true‖). 
177. 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
178. Id. at 127, 130–34.
 
179. See id. at 128; Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599–600. 
180. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605. 
181. Id. at 599. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 599–601. 
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reasonable person in Harris‘ position might even think that 
implicating someone else would decrease his practical 
exposure to criminal liability, at least so far as sentencing 
goes.
184
 
 
The Williamson Court thus drew a line based on the rule that would exclude 
those portions of the declarant‘s statement serving to inculpate an accomplice 
but not actually implicating the declarant himself. 
This approach suggested nothing less than that the admission of portions 
of Boeglin‘s statement inculpating Earnest but not directly inculpating 
Boeglin or minimizing his own culpability should not have been admitted at 
Earnest‘s trial.  But the Tenth Circuit rejected Earnest‘s reliance on the 
relatively recent decision in Williamson.
185
  The circuit court observed that the 
lower courts had not based their conclusion that Boeglin‘s statement was 
properly admitted at trial solely on the fact that it could be characterized as a 
statement against Boeglin‘s penal interest.186  Instead, the court agreed that 
Boeglin‘s statement against his penal interest was admissible against Earnest 
because the statement additionally had been found to have particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness discerned in the lower courts‘ analyses.187 
The Tenth Circuit noted that the magistrate judge held that Boeglin‘s 
statement demonstrated the requisite reliability for admission based on the 
following: 
 
In addition to finding that the statement was primarily against 
Boeglin‘s penal interest, the magistrate determined that the 
statement was reliable because: (1) Boeglin was not induced 
by promises by the police or district attorney to confess; 
(2) Boeglin had no cause to retaliate against Earnest nor 
would he lightly decide to be a ―snitch‖; (3) Boeglin was 
willing to undergo a lie detector test; and (4) Boeglin‘s 
emotional state was no more agitated than would be expected 
from one arrested on a murder charge.
188
 
 
Yet, none of these findings demonstrated any particular reliability on 
Boeglin‘s part; rather, at best they merely reflected no affirmative facts that 
 
184. Id. at 604. 
185. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 1996).  Earnest argued that 
Williamson provided guidance in the resolution of his constitutional confrontation claim, while 
recognizing that the decision had been based on construction and application of the applicable federal 
evidence rule, rather than on Sixth Amendment grounds.  See id. 
186. Id. at 1134. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1132. 
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would undermine his credibility.  For example, the issue of whether Boeglin 
lacked cause to retaliate against Earnest actually simply shows that the 
magistrate found no motive for retaliation, but that does not make the 
statement reliable; instead, a finding of an obvious motive for retaliation 
would have served to demonstrate its likely unreliability.  In other words, the 
underlying theory of admissibility was simply that Boeglin inculpated himself 
and that there were no apparent factors compromising the integrity of his 
assertions to police. 
This approach reflects the flaw inherent in reliability analysis because it 
focuses on the lack of objective factors undermining reliability rather than on 
positive factors supporting reliability.  For instance, the ―fact‖ that Boeglin 
was willing to take a lie detector test presupposes he would have passed the 
test.  But that fact can hardly substitute for a passing score, and there is no 
evidence that Boeglin ever passed, or indeed took, or was even offered a 
polygraph test to support his statement.  Had he been offered the test, taken it, 
and passed it, that fact might have indicated the reliability of his statement but 
for the typical problem posed by the general inadmissibility of polygraph 
examination results. 
Similarly, the magistrate judge relied on the ―fact‖ that Boeglin was not 
offered any kind of deal, yet his statement itself reflects that he was trying to 
make a deal for cooperation.
189
  The court quoted from the actual statement: ―I 
was hoping I could make some kind of deal.‖190  And, in the quoted portion of 
his statement, Boeglin claimed that his role in the actual murder involved an 
attempt to cut the victim‘s throat, yet the knife would not cut, and someone 
else shot the victim.
191
  Here, Boeglin‘s intent both to make a deal with police 
by cooperating and to minimize his actual participation in the murder itself 
reflects precisely the considerations leading the Williamson majority to 
 
189. Id. at 1131–32. 
190. Id. at 1134. 
191. Id.  The circuit court quoted from Boeglin‘s statement: 
 
I was setting here, [the victim] was here, Rob was here, and I was there, and 
uh—I opened up my door and the car slid around like that, and I fell out 
my . . . door, and uh—[the victim] jumped out his, and—soon as he turned, he 
caught it by—right between the eyes and uh—he . . . was still alive, and I had 
the knife with me—I went to cut his throat, but it didn‘t cut—and I was—cut it 
again and it just barely cut it, and—I just dropped the knife after that—and—I 
don‘t know who else—could it be, but uh—the gun started jamming up, and 
uh—I don‘t know how many shots he jammed on—they reloaded it, and—fired 
two more shots into him—uh I guess into his head, I don‘t know—then we 
jumped into the car . . . and cleaned up everything . . . . 
Id. 
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restrict admission of out-of-court statements by accomplices.
192
  But in 
Williamson, the majority found that Harris‘s statement had been improperly 
admitted based on a generic categorization of its contents as against his 
interest and reversed where no independent consideration of the contents and 
their implications for credibility had been undertaken.
193
  Because the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that the findings of lower courts on the existence of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness supporting admissions had been 
made by the state court and magistrate judge, it held that Williamson did not 
require relief in Earnest.
194
 
Williamson showed the Court‘s continuing concern with admission of 
non-testifying accomplices‘ statements made to police as substantive evidence 
against their alleged confederates at trial.  The Court did not expressly 
overrule Williamson in Crawford.  However, the admission of the 
accomplice‘s testimony statement without testing by cross-examination is 
clearly barred by Crawford, assuming defense counsel timely objects or 
moves to exclude the statement.  However, Williamson retains validity with 
regard to admission of statements purportedly made to third persons rather 
than police, or not intended for use as testimony in an official proceeding or in 
the context of a civil trial. 
4.  Foreshadowing Crawford: Lilly v. Virginia 
Lilly addressed similar concerns about the admission of out-of-court 
statements by accomplices not available for cross-examination before the trial 
jury.
195
  But it did so in one particularly critical context; in Lilly the out-of-
court declaration was not clearly self-inculpatory on the key issue at the 
defendant‘s trial.196  Although the declarant, Mark Lilly, admitted that he had 
been drinking with his brother, Benjamin Lilly, and his co-defendant, Barker, 
he denied that he had participated in the capital crime at all, implicating 
Benjamin in the planning of the carjacking and murder of the victim.
197
  Mark 
Lilly‘s statement placed him in proximity of the offense and admittedly 
showed him to be a willing participant in some of the less serious offenses 
committed by the three men during a crime spree that lasted two days.
198
  He 
identified his brother, however, as the individual who shot the murder 
victim.
199
 
 
192. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994). 
193. Id. 
194. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1133–34. 
195. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
196. Id. at 121. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 120–21. 
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The state trial court admitted Mark Lilly‘s statement at his brother‘s trial 
as an admission against his penal interest.
200
  Benjamin was convicted of the 
capital murder and sentenced to death.
201
  On appeal, the state supreme court 
upheld the conviction, finding that Mark‘s statement to police was properly 
admitted as a declaration against his penal interest.
202
  Under Virginia law, the 
court held that statements against penal interest constitute ―‗firmly rooted‘ 
exception[s] to the hearsay rule,‖203 relying on the Court‘s decision in White v. 
Illinois,
204
 which had recognized that certain kinds of statements had 
traditionally been regarded as sufficiently reliable for admission at trial 
despite the lack of opportunity for testing by cross-examination.
205
  The state 
court conceded that Mark Lilly‘s statement actually shifted blame for the 
capital crime to his brother but held that his apparent motivation in doing so 
could be considered by the trial jury in evaluating the credibility of his 
assertions to police.
206
 
Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, led the 
plurality in rejecting the state court‘s finding that the penal interest exception 
constituted a ―firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule‖ alone justifying 
admission of Mark Lilly‘s statement without testing by cross-examination.207  
Instead, the plurality observed that this exception was simply too broad,
208
 
defining a class too large for analysis, as the Lee Court had found.
209
  So for 
the plurality, admission of such statements would be acceptable only if the 
statement not only was contrary to the declarant‘s penal interest, but also met 
the Roberts requirement for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
210
  In 
 
200. Id. at 121–22. 
201. Id. at 122. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).  In White, the Court seemingly retreated from its earlier holding in 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), regarding admissibility of statements made by child declarants 
concerning abuse.  In contrast to statements that were effectively the product of questioning or 
interrogation, as in Wright, 497 U.S. at 826–27, the White Court found that the spontaneous 
statements to an officer were admissible as fitting within a ―firmly rooted exception to the hearsay 
rule,‖ White, 502 U.S. at 355–56.  Thus, the White Court concluded that ―[w]here proffered hearsay 
has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, 
the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.‖  Id. at 356.  In Crawford, Justice Scalia questioned the 
viability of White in light of the fact that the question addressed there focused on the unavailability of 
the witness.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004). 
205. White, 502 U.S. at 356. 
206. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122–23 (citing Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 
1998)). 
207. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127–34. 
208. Id. at 127. 
209. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986). 
210. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134–35. 
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so holding, however, the plurality did not reject the penal interest exception as 
wholly insufficient for admission of accomplice statements.
211
  Rather, it 
simply approached their admission with the same extreme caution noted by 
Justice Blackmun, the author of Ohio v. Roberts,
212
 in dissenting in Lee: 
 
[A]ccomplice confessions ordinarily are untrustworthy 
precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the 
penal interest of the declarant.  It is of course against one‘s 
penal interest to confess to criminal complicity, but often that 
interest can be advanced greatly by ascribing the bulk of the 
blame to one‘s confederates.  It is in circumstances raising the 
latter possibility—circumstances in which the accomplice‘s 
out-of-court statements implicating the defendant may be 
very much in the accomplice‘s penal interest—that we have 
viewed the accomplice‘s statements as ―inevitably 
suspect.‖213 
 
The plurality insisted that admission of Mark Lilly‘s statement implicating his 
brother in the capital murder could not rest simply on its character as a 
statement against his penal interest but must also satisfy the requirement for 
added indicia of reliability or guarantees of its trustworthiness.
214
  Here, the 
plurality concluded that Mark‘s allegations in the statement failed to meet the 
constitutional standard for admission without testing by cross-examination.
215
 
The plurality found, for instance, that the mere fact the statement 
accurately described the offense—that it was corroborated by other evidence 
at trial—was irrelevant.216  Similarly, the plurality rejected the State‘s reliance 
on the fact that Mark‘s statement was made voluntarily after he had been 
warned of his constitutional rights, finding that ―a suspect‘s consciousness of 
his Miranda rights has little, if any, bearing on the likelihood of truthfulness 
of his statements.‖217  And finally, the plurality concluded that the mere fact 
that Mark‘s statement subjected him to ―technical‖ criminal liability was 
insufficient to demonstrate its reliability precisely because it contained 
 
211. Id. 
212. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
213. Lee, 476 U.S. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 136, 141–42 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)) (―Due to his strong motivation to implicate the 
defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant‘s statements about what the defendant said or did 
are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.‖). 
214. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134–35. 
215. Id. at 137. 
216. Id. at 137–38 (relying on Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)). 
217. Id. at 138. 
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material inculpating others, citing the ―natural motive [for him] to attempt to 
exculpate himself as much as possible.‖218 
The remainder of the Court concurred in the reversal ordered by the 
plurality.  Justices Scalia and Thomas limited their agreement only insofar as 
the statement admitted constituted a statement made for purposes of official 
proceedings—that is, Mark Lilly‘s statement constituted testimonial hearsay 
requiring testing by cross-examination.
219
  They did not join in Justice 
Stevens‘s lengthy analysis of the penal interest exception and its role vis-à-vis 
the confrontation guarantee, leaving open the possibility that non-testimonial 
hearsay would be subject to admission without the required heightened 
analysis the plurality would impose for statements offered as within that 
exception.
220
  The Chief Justice, joined by Justices O‘Connor and Kennedy, 
concurred in the result
221
 but declined to hold that the penal interest exception 
was not traditionally recognized precisely because he found that the statement 
was insufficiently inculpatory as to Mark Lilly to warrant admission as a 
penal interest exception at all.
222
  Similarly, the Chief Justice also concluded 
that the prosecution had failed to meet the second prong of Roberts, a showing 
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission of 
accomplice statements required to meet the heightened reliability showing the 
plurality demanded.
223
 
Thus, the Chief Justice, consistent with his earlier position in New Mexico 
v. Earnest,
224
 did not assess the constitutional viability of Ohio v. Roberts for 
admission of accomplice statements.  Instead of confronting the questions 
about whether the standards upon which the lower court had admitted the 
statement were themselves appropriate, he simply found that neither standard 
could be met in light of the state court‘s opinion.225  He concurred in the 
disposition because Virginia had failed under either existing approach that he 
had previously endorsed in Earnest.
226
 
What emerges from the split in the Court in Lilly is that the decision failed 
to resolve issues relating to admission of accomplice confessions in the 
 
218. Id. at 138–39 (emphasis added). 
219. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 143–44 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
220. See id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 143–44 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
221. Id. at 144, 146 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
222. Id. at 146.  The plurality concluded: ―The decisive fact, which we make explicit today, is 
that accomplices‘ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted 
exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.‖  Id. at 134 & n.5. 
223. Id. at 149. 
224. 477 U.S. 648 (1986). 
225. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145–48. 
226. Id. 
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absence of cross-examination, while at the same time suggesting that the 
Roberts doctrine had simply proved unworkable in the context of the 
confrontation guarantee, at least with respect to the inherently suspect 
statements of accomplices.  For instance, in post-Lilly cases the New Mexico 
Supreme Court departed from the plurality‘s rejection of the penal interest 
exception, standing alone, as warranting admission of accomplice statements 
without cross-examination. 
In a series of cases, the New Mexico court declined to be bound by the 
Lilly plurality‘s view, instead carving out a state law exception to cross-
examination for declarations held to be against the declarant‘s penal interest, 
much as Virginia had.  In State v. Torres,
227
 the court had held that it regarded 
this hearsay exception to be firmly rooted.
228
  There, the out-of-court 
statement inculpating the defendant had been introduced at trial through a 
police detective who testified that it had been made by an accomplice during 
interrogation after the declarant denied remembering the events that were 
purportedly reflected in the contents of the statement.
229
 
The defense argued that the court should follow the Supreme Court‘s 
analysis in Williamson and hold that the trial court erred in admitting the 
statement because it was not truly self-inculpatory and primarily contrary to 
the declarant‘s interest and, consequently, did not come within the ambit of 
the hearsay exception.
230
  The court noted that it was not bound by the 
Supreme Court‘s construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence but chose to 
follow the Court‘s lead.231  It also explained the New Mexico view that the 
penal interest exception reflects a traditionally recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule under state law.
232
  Because the witness had provided information 
implicating him in the offense generally, the court concluded that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statement was against his 
penal interest.
233
  Although the witness claimed to be unable to recall the 
contents of his statement, the court pointed out that he was vigorously crossed 
on this failure of memory.
234
  The court thus concluded that there was no 
 
227. 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998).  The court held in Torres that statements against penal 
interest function as per se exceptions to the general confrontation requirements because such 
statements are firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule and therefore bear ―adequate indicia of 
reliability.‖  Id. at 1277–78. 
228. Id. at 1277. 
229. Id. at 1270. 
230. Id. at 1271. 
231. Id. at 1272. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 1274–75. 
234. Id. at 1276.  The court relied on United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556, 560 (1988), 
where the Court held that confrontation was satisfied by the opportunity to cross a witness claiming 
memory loss because the jury was able to assess the witness‘s demeanor while testifying under oath. 
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confrontation violation where there had been opportunity to cross the 
declarant and where the statement arguably exposed him to prosecution for 
homicide.
235
 
The court later affirmed its position in Torres in State v. Gonzales.
236
  
However, it did so in the context of testimony by a co-conspirator who 
reported inculpatory statements made to him by the accused.
237
  On rehearing, 
the Gonzales court considered the applicability of the intervening decision in 
Lilly.
238
  It explained that Lilly was not persuasive because the statement 
reviewed there would not have met the requirements for admission under the 
New Mexico evidence rule authorizing admission of declarations against 
penal interest
239
 because it was not against the declarant‘s interest.240  
Moreover, the court distinguished Lilly precisely because the accomplice‘s 
statement in Gonzales had been made to a third person, not to police during 
the course of custodial interrogation.
241
 
The court again rejected reliance on Lilly in State v. Martinez-
Rodriguez,
242
 noting that it had previously rejected the applicability of Lilly on 
rehearing in Gonzales.
243
  Once again, the statement admitted in Martinez-
Rodriguez was contained in a letter purportedly written by the defendant to his 
confederates rather than having been made during the course of police 
interrogation.
244
 
And in State v. Desnoyers,
245
 the court again considered the admission of 
out-of-court declarations against penal interest made to third persons rather 
than in the context of custodial interrogation by police or in testimonial 
statements intended for use in official proceedings.
246
  The statement 
inculpating the accused was purportedly made by the co-defendant to another 
inmate while in custody, who then testified at the defendant‘s trial.247  The 
 
235. Torres, 971 P.2d at 1280. 
236. 989 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1025 (2000). 
237. Id. at 421. 
238. Id. at 426–27. 
239. N.M. R. EVID. 11-804(B)(3). 
240. Gonzales, 989 P.2d at 428. 
241. Id. at 426–27. 
242. 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001). 
243. Id. at 278.  The state court rejected the argument that its continuing acceptance of the 
penal interest exception as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule should be repudiated in light 
of Lilly.  Id.  Instead, it concluded: ―We are unpersuaded by Defendant‘s argument and reaffirm that, 
in New Mexico, a statement against penal interest within the meaning of Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a 
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.‖  Id. 
244. Id. at 277. 
245. 55 P.3d 968 (N.M. 2002). 
246. Id. at 974–75. 
247. Id. 
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court noted that the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine the testifying 
witness at trial on the question of his credibility.
248
  The court rejected the 
claim that the defendant was denied confrontation because he could not 
compel the co-defendant who purportedly bragged about the offense to others 
in jail to testify and be cross-examined about the claims made by the jailhouse 
informant.
249
 
The New Mexico Supreme Court thus continued to apply the exception to 
hearsay for statements against penal interest as a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception well after the Lilly plurality had called this substitute for cross-
examination into question.  But the critical issue posed by Lilly and later 
Crawford simply was not present because no cases involved statements 
admitted in trial that were testimonial statements made by accomplices to 
police and thus susceptible to the suspicion that they represented distortions of 
facts designed to benefit the declarant.
250
 
Not only did Lilly suggest the Court‘s movement away from the analytical 
framework based on assumptions of reliability as supplanting the requirement 
for cross-examination, at least with regard to accomplice statements to 
police,
251
 but also it had a definite implication for Earnest.  Had his claim 
 
248. Id. at 975. 
249. Id. at 974–75. 
250. In State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 146 (N.M. 2005), the New Mexico 
Supreme Court referred to this prior line of cases before discussing Crawford.  The court noted: 
 
From Earnest II up until Johnson, New Mexico courts continually applied the 
Roberts reliability test (―indicia of reliability‖) to accomplice statements, 
regardless of whether there had been an opportunity to cross-examine. 
Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146 (citing State v. Desnoyers, 55 P.3d 968 (N.M. 2002); State v. Martinez-
Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001); State v. Torres, 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998)).  Westlaw‘s 
KeyCite feature indicates that Forbes abrogated the court‘s prior decisions in both Martinez-
Rodriguez and Desnoyers, but this conclusion is in doubt because the admission of out-of-court 
statements made contrary to the declarant‘s interests in both cases did not involve an inability to 
challenge testimonial statements by cross-examination.  Because the statements in both cases had not 
been made with expectation of their use in subsequent litigation—whether because they were made 
to co-defendants or while bragging to inmates, respectively—statements of these types likely remain 
admissible in a post-Crawford world because they are not testimonial in nature.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―An accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.‖); see also State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 707 (N.M. 2004) (recognizing that Crawford 
left open the possibility that non-testimonial statements would continue to be admitted under the 
exception). 
251. But as the Crawford majority would note, the apparent caution urged by the Court in Lilly 
in admitting accomplice statements, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999), was in fact not 
borne out in practice in the country‘s trial courts, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64.  The Crawford Court 
counted and cited some dozen post-Lilly cases in which accomplice statements had been admitted 
despite the absence of cross-examination and noted Professor Roger Kirst‘s conclusion that in 
twenty-five of seventy post-Lilly cases, trial courts had ruled uncrossed accomplice statements 
admissible.  Id. at 63–64; see Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation 
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involving admission of Boeglin‘s statement at trial been presented to the 
Court after Lilly, the combined reasoning of the four-Justice plurality rejecting 
the penal interest exception, standing alone as the basis for admissibility, with 
the votes of Justices Scalia and Thomas, would have formed a solid core of 
votes for reversal of his conviction.
252
 
It would, however, take the Court‘s decision in Crawford for Earnest to 
seize the opportunity for relief. 
B.  Crawford’s Rejection of the Flawed Rationale of Roberts and Lee 
Justice Scalia began his assault on Roberts in Crawford eloquently: 
―Roberts‘ failings were on full display in the proceedings below.‖253 
The Crawford Court approached the question of admissibility of Sylvia‘s 
statement from a general posture favoring in-court cross-examination but did 
so based on the particularly important factual context of the case.
254
  Because 
Sylvia was an accomplice in the offense,
255
 regardless of potential limitations 
on the extent of her culpability, the opinion rests in large part upon the 
importance of cross-examination in testing the reliability of Sylvia as a 
witness and the accuracy of her assertions.
256
  Instead of relying on 
generalizations about the reliability of her statement as against her own 
interest, the majority looked to the rationale supporting cross-examination as 
essential to the defense in this context. 
The unique role of cross-examination for purposes of the confrontation 
guarantee is at the heart of Justice Scalia‘s reappraisal in Crawford.  The 
historical significance of the law‘s concern for the right of the accused to 
respond to a criminal charge is evident in Justice Scalia‘s lengthy discussion 
of the origin of the confrontation right in the common law.
257
  But his opinion 
did not reflect a novel approach in the Court;
258
 in fact, in Mattox v. United 
 
Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 105 (2003). 
252. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Twice Grilled, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 151, 153–55 (2003) 
(noting the vote in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), supported the New Mexico Supreme Court 
disposition in Earnest I). 
253. 541 U.S. at 65. 
254. Id. at 68–69. 
255. Id. at 65. 
256. See id. at 66. 
257. Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the majority includes extensive historical analysis of 
confrontation, focusing on English common law traditions—particularly with respect to the 
significance of the absence of cross-examination raised as an issue in the trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh—and early American precedents.  Id. at 43–62. 
258. In fact, the Crawford Court had observed that the disposition in Roberts was consistent 
with its holding in other decisions, while characterizing the rationale advanced by the Roberts 
majority as overly broad.  Id. at 60.  The Court reiterated this assessment in Whorton v. Bockting, 127 
S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007). 
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States, a similar historical analysis had been employed in justifying admission 
of prior testimony elicited in proceedings prior to a witness‘s death. 259 
The thrust of Roberts is that if statements are sufficiently reliable, either 
because they reflect firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule or are marked 
by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, cross-examination affords 
little additional protection for the defendant at trial.
260
  For the criminal 
defendant, the importance of cross-examination lies not only in the 
opportunity to question the factual accuracy of assertions made in the 
accomplice‘s statement that implicate the accused, but also in requiring the 
accomplice to function as any other witness whose credibility is subject to 
assessment by the jury observing his or her testimony.  The value of cross-
examination is particularly important where the witness has claimed particular 
knowledge about the offense that is offered as credible precisely because the 
witness is an accomplice who has every reason to know about the particular 
facts of the offense and the defendant‘s role in its commission.261  For the 
same reason, the accomplice has available the most compelling tool for 
manipulating the investigation and prosecution of the case to shift primary 
focus to the accused and away from the accomplice. 
The Roberts Court‘s rationale failed to accommodate the very dangerous 
prospect that accomplices can manipulate the prosecution process in a way 
that distorts the fact-finding function to their benefit.  This is evident in Lee 
when the Court admitted that those witnesses are inherently suspect yet failed 
to draw a line in the Roberts doctrine preventing the use of its ―reliability‖ 
assumptions in dispensing with the need for cross-examination.
262
 
Although Sylvia‘s status as an accomplice raised the traditional concern 
for the credibility of accomplices who may be seeking to implicate others in 
an effort to better themselves in the criminal investigation, Crawford does not 
limit the Court‘s requirement for cross-examination to admission of 
accomplice or co-defendant declarations.
263
  Rather, the opinion focuses on all 
statements that are testimonial in nature, reflecting their intended or expected 
use in official proceedings so that statements made by other witnesses who are 
 
259. See 156 U.S. 237, 240–42, 246–50 (1895). 
260. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
261. Nevertheless, courts still consider the accomplice‘s ability to describe the circumstances 
of the offense with particularity as especially important, even though it would appear to be the very 
minimum that should be expected of an accomplice implicating himself and others in the commission 
of a crime.  See, for example, the Tenth Circuit‘s observation in Earnest v. Dorsey in valuing the 
credibility of Boeglin‘s untested statement: ―[W]e find the statement describes the crime at a level of 
detail which would be difficult to render in a fabricated admission.‖  87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
262. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986). 
263. See 541 U.S. at 68. 
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not susceptible to being characterized as accomplices are also governed by the 
holding.
264
  This has certainly been demonstrated in the post-Crawford history 
of litigation of confrontation claims.
265
 
Crawford is significant precisely because the Court did not simply 
announce a departure from existing precedent in announcing a new rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure
266—these pronouncements have been 
common over the past half century of the Court‘s review of criminal process 
in light of the protections afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Rather, the Court rejected the implication drawn 
from prior decisions that had led lower courts to conclude that admission of 
non-crossed statements of non-testifying co-defendants was permissible if 
those statements met certain criteria for credibility.
267
  The Court found 
instead: 
 
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers‘ design to afford the States 
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does 
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such 
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.  
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ―testimonial.‖  Whatever else the 
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; 
and to police interrogations.  These are the modern practices 
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed.
268
 
 
The Crawford Court‘s decision in reversing the trend toward admission of 
declarants‘ out-of-court statements not subject to cross-examination reflects 
an appreciation for the historical context in which the Sixth Amendment 
 
264. Id. 
265. For an interesting assessment of the extent to which Crawford and Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006) (the Court acknowledging that the cross-examination requirement will 
have the perverse effect of protecting perpetrators of domestic abuse whose victims are unwilling to 
testify in court by restricting admission of their reports of abuse to police), have actually 
disadvantaged certain classes of litigants, such as battered women, see generally Tom Lininger, 
Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 272 (2006). 
266. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (―[A] case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final.‖). 
267. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68. 
268. Id. at 68. 
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confrontation guarantee serves the interest of accurate fact-finding.
269
  The 
decision is limited in important respects—addressing only the issue of 
admission of testimonial statements, that is, statements either deliberately 
designed for use in official proceedings or likely to result in their use for 
purposes of proof of fact in a judicial proceeding.
270
  The Court noted that 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony not subjected to cross-
examination, and ―similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially‖ fit within the context of testimonial 
statements typically requiring testing by cross-examination prior to 
admission.
271
  Thus not all out-of-court statements implicate the element of 
cross-examination as critical to the confrontation guarantee.
272
 
Significantly, Crawford demonstrates the willingness of some Justices to 
re-examine doctrine that has wandered from the traditional understanding of 
limitations imposed upon government through manipulation associated with 
more flexible approaches to constitutional interpretation.
273
  Inexplicably, the 
Justices never alluded to or even cited the Rehnquist concurrence in New 
Mexico v. Earnest in assessing the Court‘s perceived error in Roberts.274  In 
returning to historical sources when assessing the context in which the 
confrontation guarantee was articulated, the Court repudiated the more 
flexible view of the protection advanced in Ohio v. Roberts, one in which a 
general paradigm for assessing reliability had replaced the formal process of 
cross-examination for resolution of Sixth Amendment questions.
275
  But 
Crawford represents more than a manifestation of a strict constructionist 
approach that defers to the historical context in which the Constitution is to be 
interpreted.  It addresses a most troubling problem for criminal defendants—
the inability to challenge allegations that are often false and almost always 
self-serving that have been admitted as evidence at trial under a generalized 
theory of their potential for reliability. 
IV.  CRAWFORD AND ITS RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IN EARNEST 
The New Mexico Supreme Court overruled State v. Torres
276
 in its 2004 
decision in State v. Alvarez-Lopez,
277
 based on the Supreme Court‘s action in 
 
269. Justice White, writing for the majority in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 
(1970), also traced the historical roots of cross-examination to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.  See 
supra note 257. 
270. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
271. Id. at 51. 
272. Id. (―[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment‘s core concerns.‖). 
273. See id. at 68. 
274. See id. at 62–65. 
275. See id. at 61. 
276. State v. Torres, 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998). 
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Crawford.
278
  In so doing, Justice Minzner referred to the ―splintered‖ opinion 
in Lilly that had invited significant comment but had effectively permitted the 
court to continue to hold that the penal interest exception constituted a firmly 
rooted exception under New Mexico law.
279
  The court acknowledged that 
Lilly had questioned the continuing reliance on this exception as a basis for 
admission in the absence of cross-examination of accomplice statements,
280
 
but its continued reliance on Lilly demonstrates the Supreme Court‘s 
somewhat reluctant but gradual path toward renunciation of the Roberts 
rationale when applied to this category of hearsay. 
The significance of Crawford for Earnest was both theoretical and 
practical.  In theory, Crawford affirmed precisely the argument Earnest had 
advanced in attacking the reliability of his conviction based on Boeglin‘s 
statement to police.  Boeglin‘s statement clearly constituted the type of 
testimonial statement Crawford addressed directly.  Like Sylvia‘s statement, 
Boeglin‘s statement to investigating officers was the type of statement 
designed for use in an official proceeding for proof of a fact.
281
 
Without the opportunity to cross-examine Boeglin before the jury, Earnest 
was denied the only meaningful opportunity to test the credibility of Boeglin‘s 
factual disclosures to the police or to question his motivation for implicating 
Earnest before the trial jury, which would have been in the best position to 
assess Boeglin‘s personal credibility and the reliability of his claims. 
Practically, Crawford gave Earnest another opportunity to litigate.  But 
the litigation option was limited to New Mexico state court proceedings under 
Rule 5-802, which authorizes state post-conviction litigation challenging the 
legality of conviction.
282
  The New Mexico procedure does not limit 
applications for post-conviction relief, affording Earnest the option of filing a 
second petition for habeas relief even though he had previously raised his 
alternative state constitutional argument in a first petition for habeas corpus.
283
 
Ironically, even though Earnest was relying on the interpretation of a 
federal constitutional protection in an intervening decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, he would not have been permitted to raise the claim 
based on Crawford in a federal habeas action for at least three reasons.  First, 
the federal statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal habeas 
 
277. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004). 
278. Id. at 706–07. 
279. Id. at 706. 
280. Id. 
281. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not.‖). 
282. N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802. 
283. See id. 
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claims
284—long passed for Earnest—in contrast to the New Mexico 
procedure, which includes no limitations period.
285
  Second, the application of 
the Teague new rules doctrine prevented the application of Crawford in the 
federal habeas process until such time as the Supreme Court announced that 
the new rule was to be applied retroactively.
286
  And third, even had Crawford 
been afforded retrospective application at the time it was announced, the 
federal habeas statute specifically excludes application of the newly 
announced retroactive rule to a litigant whose claim was previously asserted 
in a federal habeas proceeding.
287
 
Because of the latitude recognized by Rule 5-802 governing state post-
conviction proceedings, the Court‘s reversal of the Ohio v. Roberts reliability 
doctrine in Crawford opened the door for reconsideration of the constitutional 
legality of Earnest‘s conviction.  The state court had already determined that 
admission of Boeglin‘s statement was critical to conviction.288  Thus, the only 
issue to be addressed in Earnest‘s second state post-conviction proceeding 
was whether Crawford should be applied to afford Earnest relief from his 
conviction. 
A.  Crawford and Retroactivity 
Retroactive application of Crawford proved an immediate issue for 
litigation for Earnest and other defendants whose convictions rested on the 
 
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). 
285. N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802. 
286. E.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (―The nonretroactivity principle 
prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule 
announced after his conviction and sentence became final.‖). 
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2000).  Subsection (b)(1) provides: ―A claim 
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented 
in a prior application shall be dismissed.‖  Subsection (b)(2)(A) provides: 
 
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under 
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 
unless— 
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable . . . . 
Thus, it appears that a litigant who correctly anticipated a change in the law in arguing his claim in a 
prior federal habeas action is denied the benefit of a new rule subsequently recognized by the 
Supreme Court and given retroactive application.  In light of the specific language of subsection (b), 
had Crawford been afforded retroactive application, Earnest would not have been entitled to rely on 
that retroactive application precisely because he had challenged his conviction in an earlier petition.  
See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130–34 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting the same argument 
ultimately resulting in the change in the law announced later in Crawford). 
288. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985) (terming admission of 
Boeglin‘s statement ―highly prejudicial‖). 
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admission of inculpatory statements made by accomplices not subjected to 
cross-examination. 
1.  Retroactive Application as an Exception to Teague‘s New Rules Doctrine 
A number of circuits considered the question of retroactivity in light of the 
principles set out in Teague v. Lane,
289
 with typically unsuccessful results for 
litigants seeking to reopen convictions based upon the prosecution‘s use of 
uncrossed accomplice testimony.  The Tenth Circuit rejected retroactive 
application in Brown v. Uphoff,
290
 as did the Second Circuit in Mungo v. 
Duncan.
291
  An Eighth Circuit panel opined in dicta that Crawford would not 
apply retroactively,
292
 while the First Circuit declined to reach the issue.
293
  
Only the Ninth Circuit, in Bockting v. Bayer,
294
 held that Crawford should be 
applied retroactively prior to the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s disposition.295  
At the point at which certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court in 
Bockting,
296
 the Nevada attorney general could point to substantial authority 
rejecting retroactive application of Crawford in the federal circuits and state 
appellate courts.
297
 
 
289. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
290. 381 F.3d 1219, 1225–27 (10th Cir. 2004). 
291. 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004). 
292. Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2004). 
293. Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004). 
294. 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit panel opinion was issued on February 
22, 2005.  The petition for rehearing, en banc, was denied by that court on August 11, 2005.  418 
F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2005).  State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest was argued in the New Mexico Supreme 
Court on May 11, 2005. 
295. Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1012–13. 
296. Whorton v. Bockting, 547 U.S. 1127 (2006) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).  In an 
unusual irony, Bockting successfully petitioned the Court for certiorari following affirmance of his 
conviction on direct appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court.  Bockting v. Bayer, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).  
The Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826–
27 (1990), in which the Court had held that admission of certain statements made by children relating 
to sexual abuse violated the Confrontation Clause where the statements were made in response to 
questioning and offered as an exception to the hearsay rule.  Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 
1178 n.2 (2007).  On remand, the state supreme court found no violation under Wright, again 
affirming.  Bockting v. State, 847 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. 1993).  Once Bockting was forced to 
litigate the claim in federal habeas corpus, the Teague prohibition on the announcement of new rules 
in that process barred the lower federal courts from affording relief in the absence of a declaration of 
retroactive application for Crawford which was issued years later, in 2004.  See Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 
at 1178 n.2. 
297. See Petitioner‘s Brief on the Merits at 15, Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (No. 05-595), 2006 
WL 2066492. 
 
[A] growing number of circuit courts of appeal, now numbering six, have held 
that Crawford is not retroactive.  Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 
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The argument that Crawford addressed an issue to which the Teague 
retroactivity limitation should not apply was predicated on the significance 
attached to the cross-examination right in the guilt or innocence 
determination.
298
  In Teague v. Lane, the Court recognized two classes of 
exceptions to the usual operation of the non-retroactivity principle generally 
attending articulation of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure.
299
  
The first accords retroactive application to new rules that restrict the authority 
of government to proscribe particular types of conduct.
300
  For instance, the 
Court‘s rulings that certain mentally retarded individuals301 and juveniles 
under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense
302
 cannot be executed 
consistent with Eighth Amendment commands fit this exception and require 
retroactive application. 
The second exception provides for retroactive application of new rules 
that are said to be ―implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.‖303  The Court 
explained that the class of rules fitting within this exception is that which 
ensures fundamental fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding process.
304
  The 
Teague Court had recognized the possibility that a newly articulated rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure could be deemed so fundamental to the 
 
859 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v. 
Duncan, 393 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 2004); Espy v. Massac, 443 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 
2006).
2
  The two circuit courts that considered the retroactivity of Crawford 
after the Ninth Circuit‘s Bockting decision explicitly rejected that court‘s 
holding.  Espy, 443 F.3d at 1367; Lave, 444 F.3d. at 336.  ―The two judge 
Bockting majority thus stands alone in its conviction that Crawford applied 
retroactively.‖  JA 223 (O‘Scannlain, J. dissenting). 
 
2. In addition, an ever expanding number of State appellate courts have 
held that Crawford is not retroactive to cases on collateral review: Drach v. 
Bruce, [136] P. 3d [390], (Kan. 2006); Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977 
(Colo. 2006); Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005); In re Moore, 
[34] Cal. Rptr. [3d 605], (Cal. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1 2005); Danforth v. 
State, 700 N.W. 2d 530 (Minn. App. 2005); In re Markel, 154 Wash. 2d 
262, 111 P.3d 249 (2005); State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 2005); 
People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo. App. 2004); but see, State v. 
Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005) (retroactive under ―unique facts and 
procedural posture‖). 
Id. 
298. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). 
299. Id. at 311. 
300. Id. 
301. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
302. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
303. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
304. Id. at 312–13. 
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accuracy of fact-finding in the trial process that it represents a ―watershed‖ 
rule of criminal process.
305
 
In arguing that Crawford constituted such a watershed rule, proponents of 
retroactive application could point to Justice Scalia‘s characterization of the 
fundamental purpose of the cross-examination right as implicit in the 
confrontation guarantee: 
 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think 
the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment‘s protection 
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of ―reliability.‖ . . . Admitting statements 
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the 
right of confrontation.  To be sure, the Clause‘s ultimate goal 
is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather 
than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence 
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
306
 
 
If cross-examination is essential to the process by which the determination of 
reliability is to be made, then, arguably, Crawford constituted a watershed 
rule of criminal procedure, unlike rules merely prophylactic in nature.  For 
example, in a case in which retroactivity might have been assumed, Ring v. 
Arizona,
307
 involving the role of the jury in finding the existence of 
aggravating circumstances warranting consideration or imposition of a death 
sentence,
308
 the underlying principle did not require retroactive application.
309
  
But subsequently in Schriro v. Summerlin,
310
 the Court rejected retroactive 
application of Ring to vacate death sentences imposed under sentencing 
schemes comparable to those rejected in Ring.
311
  The Court‘s reasoning was 
that the actual sentencing procedure used, where a trial judge, rather than the 
jury, found aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty, 
did not necessarily implicate the accuracy of the fact-finding process.
312
  The 
Apprendi-Ring rationale, itself grounded in Sixth Amendment protections, did 
 
305. E.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (noting a ―watershed‖ rule implicates ―the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding‖). 
306. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
307. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
308. Id. at 589. 
309. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000). 
310. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
311. Id. at 358. 
312. Id. at 355–56. 
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not meet the requirement for a watershed rule as contemplated by Teague‘s 
second exception.
313
 
In contrast, the cross-examination right bears directly on the accuracy of 
fact-finding, particularly by jurors who will assess the credibility of a 
witness‘s testimony in part, at least, by observing the witness‘s demeanor 
while testifying.  Observation of the witness is a factor used by jurors in 
determining the weight given to the witness‘s testimony that cannot be 
provided by reference to probable reliability based upon factors indicating the 
likely credibility of a declarant‘s out-of-court statements. 
This reasoning was sufficiently convincing to generate limited support in 
the federal courts considering the question of retroactive application of 
Crawford.  Judge Clay of the Sixth Circuit,
314
 Judge DeMoss of the Fifth,
315
 
and Judge McKeown of the Ninth
316
 all issued separate opinions accepting the 
argument that Crawford had announced not only a new rule, but also one of 
watershed character that warranted retroactive application.  Judge DeMoss 
concluded, ―Without confrontation in such cases, the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.‖317  Judge McKeown similarly observed 
that ―the Crawford rule is one without which the likelihood of accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.‖318 
Unfortunately for litigants relying on retroactive application of Crawford 
as a basis for post-conviction relief, the argument that its rule was of 
watershed dimension and thus entitled to retroactive application would fail to 
persuade the Supreme Court. 
2.  Crawford as a Restorative Decision Rather than a New Rules Decision 
The difficulty imposed by the narrow second Teague exception to the 
retroactivity bar suggested an alternative view of Crawford, one in which the 
decision does not constitute a new rule at all.  Rather, because the Court 
characterized its previous decisions straying from the strict protections 
afforded by the Confrontation Clause as having been reached in error, Earnest 
argued that rather than a new rule, Crawford actually represented a restoration 
of the prior precedent in Douglas v. Alabama to pre-eminence in questions 
 
313. Id. at 355–58. 
314. Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 811 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring).  The panel 
applied pre-Crawford confrontation law to grant relief.  Id. at 811 (noting that a prior panel had 
rejected the Crawford retroactivity argument in Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
315. Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
316. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for reh’g en banc 
denied, 418 F.3d 1055, rev’d, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
317. Lave, 444 F.3d at 337 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). 
318. Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1021. 
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pertaining to accomplice statements.
319
  In this sense, the Court simply re-
imposed a rule dictated by precedent.  Under Teague, rules dictated by 
precedent are not new and thus not subject to its restrictive retroactivity 
doctrine.
320
 
Earnest argued that Crawford actually involved the affirmation of long-
standing constitutional doctrine, as reflected in the majority‘s 
characterization: ―We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, 
condition for admissibility of testimonial statements.  They suggest that this 
requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish 
reliability.‖321  The majority then applied this conclusion to reach the core of 
its holding: ―Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers‘ 
understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have 
been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.‖322  This language 
suggests anything but that the rule articulated in Crawford was new, and its 
significance is ultimately suggested by the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s 
decision granting Earnest relief.
323
  The New Mexico court treated Crawford 
as not announcing a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure: ―Applying 
the Teague analysis to this case, we conclude that as to the unique facts and 
procedural posture of Earnest‘s case, Crawford does not announce a new rule 
because the result was ‗dictated by precedent existing at the time‘ we 
[initially] decided Earnest.‖324 
But this argument found little support elsewhere.
325
  Only Judge Noonan, 
concurring in Bockting v. Bayer in the Ninth Circuit,
326
 would adopt this 
rationale to find that the Crawford holding was entitled to retroactive 
application.
327
 
 
319. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005). 
320. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
321. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55–56 (2004). 
322. Id. at 59. 
323. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 147–49. 
324. Id. at 147. 
325. A similar argument was made by the habeas petitioner in People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 
674, 683 (Ill. 1990), in arguing that the state court had not announced a new rule but simply 
reinterpreted an existing provision of law, essentially correcting an erroneous view.  The court 
rejected this argument, finding that it had, in fact, announced a new rule governing the proper burden 
of proof when a jury is instructed on a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in a murder 
prosecution in People v. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141 (Ill. 1988).  Flowers, 561 N.E.2d at 680–83. 
326. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
327. Id. at 1023.  Judge Noonan concluded: ―Crawford, therefore, does not announce a new 
rule.  Retroactivity is not an issue.‖  Id. 
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B.  The Application of Crawford in Earnest 
In Crawford, the Court ultimately addressed precisely the issue argued in 
New Mexico v. Earnest and addressed by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring 
opinion,
328
 in which he asserted that the Court‘s reasoning in Ohio v. Roberts 
and holding in Lee had effectively overruled Douglas v. Alabama by 
implication.
329
  Despite the fact that Crawford revisited the issue in Earnest, 
the petitioner‘s brief in Crawford did not mention the Court‘s disposition in 
Earnest or Justice Rehnquist‘s influential concurrence.330  Nor did petitioner‘s 
brief
331
 mention Williamson v. United States,
332
 in which the Court held that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which permits the admission of hearsay 
statements against the declarant‘s penal interest, ―does not allow admission of 
non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader 
narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.‖333  Similarly, an amicus brief filed 
on behalf of law professors did not mention New Mexico v. Earnest
334
 but did 
cite Williamson,
335
 noting the ability to restrict admission of accomplice 
statements on evidentiary grounds without reaching the constitutional issue.
336
  
Neither the ACLU‘s amicus brief337 nor the Solicitor General‘s brief338 
mentioned Earnest or discussed Justice Rehnquist‘s concurrence. 
1.  Earnest‘s Retroactivity Argument 
In the Earnest litigation, the State argued vigorously that the state‘s courts 
were bound to apply Crawford only in conformity with Teague 
retroactivity.
339
  Relying on federal circuit decisions holding that Crawford 
should not be applied retroactively—decisions correctly anticipating the 
 
328. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
329. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
330. Brief for Petitioner at iv–v, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940. 
331. Id. at vii. 
332. 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
333. Id. at 600–01. 
334. Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et 
al. in Support of Petitioner at iv, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958. 
335. Id. at 29 n.18. 
336. Id. 
337. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Nat‘l Ass‘n of 
Criminal Def. Lawyers, the ACLU and the ACLU of Wash. in Support of Petitioner at iv, Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961. 
338. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at v, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 
2003 WL 22228005. 
339. Response to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–5, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 
(N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1, 2004). 
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Supreme Court‘s determination in Whorton v. Bockting—the State argued that 
Earnest could not be afforded the benefit of Crawford retrospectively.
340
 
Earnest argued that regardless of whether the United States Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled favorably with regard to his reliance on Crawford on 
the retroactivity issue or the new rule issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
was entitled to apply state law retroactivity principles in deciding whether he 
should benefit from Crawford.
341
  Earnest argued that New Mexico law, 
however, required retroactive application of Crawford as a matter of state 
law.
342
 
In this latter respect Earnest relied on state retroactivity principles in 
arguing for application of Crawford on the facts of his case and conviction.
343
  
New Mexico had adopted a broad approach to retroactive application of 
decisions recognizing new causes of action or procedural rights in Beavers v. 
Johnson Controls World Services.
344
  There, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
had applied the broadest approach to retroactivity in recognizing a new cause 
of action sounding in tort for discriminatory practices in employment.
345
  The 
court held that the right to bring an action would apply retroactively even to 
acts that occurred prior to recognition of the cause of action.
346
 
Earnest argued that retroactivity of criminal decisions should be co-
extensive with that afforded in civil matters and persist in that position.
347
  On 
the federal level, civil and criminal retroactivity doctrines are comparable.  In 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
348
 the Supreme Court harmonized 
the retroactivity doctrine applicable in civil litigation with that already in 
place for criminal litigation in Griffith v. Kentucky.
349
  Griffith drew a bright 
line for retroactivity analysis, holding that new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure would apply to all cases pending on direct appeal in which the 
question had been preserved for appellate review when the new rule is 
announced by the Court.
350
  Harper applied this same general principle to 
 
340. State of New Mexico‘s Verified Petition for Stay of Order Granting Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. 29,111 (N.M. Feb. 28, 2005). 
341. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 18–19. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. 881 P.2d 1376, 1377 n.1, 1386–87 (1994). 
345. Id. at 1386–87. 
346. Id. 
347. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 18–19; see Jackson v. State, 925 
P.2d 1195, 1196 (N.M. 1996). 
348. 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
349. 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987). 
350. Id. 
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civil matters
351
 and in so doing, set the constitutional floor for application of 
new rules of law as a matter of due process. 
Earnest argued that the same principle of symmetry should be formally 
applied with respect to civil and criminal retroactivity principles under New 
Mexico law.  Because New Mexico had already recognized that Crawford 
applies to New Mexico prosecutions as a matter of federal constitutional 
law,
352
 he argued that the retroactivity issue was properly presented to the trial 
court in Earnest‘s petition for habeas relief. 
2.  The Unique Procedural Posture of Earnest 
The state supreme court‘s disposition of Earnest‘s post-conviction claim 
was itself somewhat rare.  Earnest initially filed for post-conviction relief 
directly in the high court,
353
 arguing that all factual issues necessary for 
resolution of the legal issues had already been resolved in the direct appeal 
litigation in Earnest I
354
 and II.
355
  The supreme court remanded the cause to 
the district court of conviction.
356
  The trial court issued its decision
357
 and 
entered an order granting the writ of habeas corpus.
358
  When the State filed 
for a stay of the trial court‘s order,359 the supreme court ordered Earnest to file 
a response to the State‘s petition, restyling the petition for stay as a petition 
for writ of superintending control sua sponte.
360
  Consequently, Earnest‘s case 
was styled State v. Forbes
361
 ex rel. Earnest,
362
 rather than State v. Earnest. 
 
351. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97. 
352. See generally State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998 (N.M. 2004). 
353. Earnest v. State, No. 28,864 (N.M. Aug. 24, 2004) (order granting motion for leave to file 
petition for writ of habeas corpus); see N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802. 
354. See 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985). 
355. See 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987). 
356. Earnest v. State, No. 28,864 (N.M. Sept. 29, 2004). 
357. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist Ct. Jan. 11, 2005) (deciding the writ of 
habeas corpus should be granted). 
358. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 15, 2005) (order granting the 
writ of habeas corpus); see State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (N.M. 2005).  The trial 
court specifically recognized the State‘s right to appeal from this order: ―10. The Writ of Habeas 
Corpus should be granted.  The State of New Mexico is allowed 15 days to file their Requested 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in 30 days be permitted to Appeal this Court‘s 
Decision.‖  State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54, slip op. at 10 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 11, 2005).  
The State failed to file a timely notice of appeal, however, as its notice of appeal was not filed until 
March 15, 2005, beyond the thirty days permitted for the filing of the notice of appeal under Rule 12-
201E of the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
359. State of New Mexico‘s Verified Petition for Stay of Order Granting Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, supra note 340. 
360. State v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 2, 2005) (order granting request for stay); State v. 
Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 2, 2005) (order granting motion to request a response to the petition 
for writ of superintending control).  The writ of superintending control is the device by which the 
New Mexico Supreme Court regulates practice in the district courts.  Dist. Ct. for the 2d Jud. Dist. v. 
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3.  The Earnest Court‘s Resolution of the Retroactivity Question 
In ordering relief on Earnest‘s state habeas corpus claim, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court fashioned a remedy designed to afford him the retroactive 
benefit of Crawford‘s changed view of confrontation—whether that change is 
characterized as a matter of error correction or the announcement of a new 
rule—but designed to limit its retroactive application only to Earnest.  The 
court was very careful in its explanation of its holding, saying: 
 
Granting Earnest a new trial is consistent with our 
responsibility ―to do justice to each litigant on the merits of 
his own case.‖  Our decision is limited to the very special 
facts of this case, highlighted by the fact that the very law this 
Court applied to Earnest‘s case twenty years ago has now 
been vindicated, which entitles him now to the same new trial 
he should have received back then.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the district court, lift the stay, and remand for execution of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, affording the State the opportunity to 
retry Earnest.
363
 
 
The decision rests on principles implicated, but never directly addressed, in 
the Crawford and Bockting litigation, including the issue of whether states 
 
McKenna, 881 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1994).  The court has described its power to issue the writ in broad 
terms: 
 
The power of superintending control is an extraordinary power.  It is hampered 
by no specific rules or means for its exercise.  It is so general and 
comprehensive that its complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto 
not been fully and completely known and exemplified.  It is unlimited, being 
bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise. 
State v. Roy, 60 P.2d 646, 662 (N.M. 1936) (emphasis added).  The court has looked to five criteria 
in determining whether the writ of superintending control is appropriate: 
 
It is the settled law of this jurisdiction that the writ of supervisory control will 
issue only when a ruling, order, or decision of an inferior court, within its 
jurisdiction, (1) is erroneous; (2) is arbitrary or tyrannical; (3) does gross 
injustice to the petitioner; (4) may result in irreparable injury to the petitioner; 
(5) and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than by issuance of 
the writ. 
Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 89 P.2d 615, 619 (N.M. 1936). 
361. The Honorable Jay W. Forbes, District Judge, Fifth Judicial District. 
362. See State v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 21, 2005) (order granting motion to request a 
reply to the response to the petition for writ of superintending control); see also Forbes, 119 P.3d 
144. 
363. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148–49 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted). 
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were limited by the parameters of Teague in affording retroactive application 
to decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court announcing new 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure.
364
 
First, while the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the significance 
of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Teague,365 it did not conclude that Teague 
was controlling on the question of the court‘s consideration of Crawford in 
terms of Earnest‘s claim for relief.366  Instead, the state court essentially 
adopted Earnest‘s argument that Crawford did not announce a new rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure at all.
367
  Rather, it concluded that Crawford 
simply restored the principle of Douglas v. Alabama.
368
  The court reached 
this conclusion by noting that neither the Crawford majority nor it, in its prior 
decision State v. Johnson
369
 recognizing and applying Crawford in New 
Mexico prosecutions, had made an explicit determination that the holding in 
Crawford constituted a new rule.
370
 
Once the supreme court concluded that Crawford did not announce a new 
rule, it was positioned to afford Earnest relief from his conviction without 
addressing the question of retroactivity broadly.  In this sense, the decision 
leaves open the very important question of whether other litigants are entitled 
to the benefit of an application that restores the precedential power of a prior 
decision, rather than representing the true break with precedent that the 
federal doctrine uses to describe new rules.  But Forbes did not address the 
retroactivity, generally, of a decision that changes the law but does so by 
restoring improperly neglected or avoided precedent. 
Because the case arose in the context of an extraordinary proceeding, 
however, the court likely reserved to itself the option of determining which 
other litigants, if any, could demonstrate the factual scenario warranting the 
exercise of the court‘s authority to grant relief.  Thus, rather than adopting a 
broad policy of retroactivity under New Mexico law or in not applying any 
policy of retroactivity that would have general application in state 
 
364. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 
1010 (9th Cir. 2005). 
365. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47.  The court cited State v. Mascarenas, 4 P.3d 1221, 1228 
(N.M. 2000), which had cited Teague, for the proposition that the determination of whether a new 
rule should be applied retroactively initially required consideration of whether the rule announced 
was in fact new. 
366. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 147. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. (referring to 380 U.S. 415 (1965)). 
369. See generally 98 P.3d 998 (N.M. 2004). 
370. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47. 
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proceedings, the court ordered relief based on ―the unique facts and 
procedural circumstances of this case.‖371 
But the court‘s reliance on State v. Ulibarri372 suggests that it did not 
consider itself bound by Teague as a limiting rule on the potential extension 
of retroactive benefit from a Supreme Court decision as a matter of state 
retroactivity doctrine.
373
  In Ulibarri, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
explained its exercise of the option to apply decisions retroactively or 
prospectively only
374
 within the framework of Linkletter v. Walker.
375
  In 
Linkletter, the United States Supreme Court had advanced a test for flexibility 
in the retroactivity determination, requiring the issuing court to determine 
both the policy and practice implications involved in extending the retroactive 
benefit of new rules to defendants whose cases had been litigated under 
previous rules.
376
  The court of appeals had determined that a new rule of 
procedure governing grand jury practice would apply to all cases then pending 
in the state‘s grand juries or untried on grand jury indictments, which had not 
been obtained in compliance with the rule.
377
  The supreme court affirmed the 
prospective application of the rule on certiorari.
378
 
The court of appeals opinion in Ulibarri discloses, however, uncertainty 
about the continuing viability of Linkletter analysis as a retroactivity doctrine 
under state law.
379
  But the court noted that the supreme court in Santillanes v. 
State
380
 continued to invoke Linkletter, even after that approach had been 
abandoned by the plurality in Teague.
381
  The court‘s observation may identify 
a lingering uncertainty about the extent to which state retroactivity doctrine 
should or must reflect federal principles, or simply track the supreme court‘s 
determination to apply retroactivity principles in a manner consistent with the 
court‘s concern for pursuit of justice in individual cases.  This latter approach 
may also be seen in Jackson v. State,
382
 where the court quoted with approval 
the following language from a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. 
 
371. Id. at 149. 
372. 994 P.2d 1164 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
373. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47. 
374. See Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1171–72 (―Our understanding of these cases is that reviewing 
courts should carefully weigh the effects of their rulings in light of the three factors recognized in 
Linkletter.‖). 
375. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
376. See id. at 627. 
377. Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1172. 
378. State v. Ulibarri, 997 P.2d 818, 819 (N.M. 2000). 
379. See Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1171. 
380. 849 P.2d 358, 367 (N.M. 1993) (noting that courts have inherent power to give their 
rulings prospective or retroactive application). 
381. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
382. 925 P.2d 1195 (N.M. 1996). 
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Harper:
383
  ―Generally, where the purpose of a new constitutional doctrine is 
to cure a defect in the criminal procedure which impairs the truth finding 
function, and thus raises doubt as to the validity of the guilty verdict, the rule 
will be given full retroactive effect.‖384 
In Earnest, the court rejected reliance on authority permitting admission 
of a testimonial statement made by an accomplice without the defendant being 
afforded an opportunity to test the reliability of the statement by cross-
examination.
385
  Because such statements have historically been characterized 
as presumptively unreliable as a result of the accomplice‘s motive to shift 
blame or negotiate favorable treatment in return for the statement, convictions 
resting on these statements implicitly raise issues of the accuracy of the fact-
finding function and reliability of the verdict.
386
  Crawford corrected that error 
in the Court‘s confrontation jurisprudence; in Forbes, the court applied the 
correction for Earnest‘s benefit. 
Within the factual context of Earnest II, the supreme court‘s 
understanding of what constitutes a new rule proved to be particularly 
important.  In Mascarenas, the court had observed: ―‗To put it differently, a 
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing 
at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final.‘‖387  The Forbes majority 
focused on the rules applicable at the time of Earnest‘s trial in holding that the 
court had been correct in Earnest I in applying Douglas as the basis for 
reversal of the conviction.
388
  Finding that the Earnest I court had essentially 
been vindicated by Crawford, the Forbes majority concluded that Crawford 
had not announced a new rule at all but merely restored Douglas to its 
controlling position as authority regarding admissibility of uncrossed 
accomplice statements.
389
  The Forbes majority noted: ―The New Mexico 
Supreme Court was correct to follow Douglas, which we believe the analysis 
in Crawford now confirms.‖390 
Justice Serna, in dissent, focused on the finality of the conviction at the 
time of the change in law.
391
  For him, and consistent with the Court‘s 
 
383. 516 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1986). 
384. Jackson, 925 P.2d at 1196 (quoting Harper, 516 A.2d at 323). 
385. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 539–40 (N.M. 1987). 
386. Id. at 540. 
387. State v. Mascarenas, 4 P.3d 1221, 1229 (N.M. 2000) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 301 (1989)). 
388. State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005). 
389. Id. (―In any event, it cannot be disputed that Douglas, which held that an accomplice 
statement was inadmissible unless the defendant had a right to cross-examine, was good law at the 
time we decided Earnest I.‖) (citations omitted). 
390. Id. (referring to Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
391. Id. at 150 (Serna, J., dissenting). 
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characterization of the ―direct appeal‖ as concluding with certiorari 
proceedings, Earnest‘s conviction was not actually final until the court‘s 
reversal was vacated in New Mexico v. Earnest.
392
  Thus, he found no 
unfairness in the fact that Earnest was tried under a different rule than that 
ultimately applied following remand by the Supreme Court.
393
  But for the 
Forbes majority, this change in the rules of admissibility for confrontation 
purposes after the fact of Earnest‘s trial was not acceptable.  The majority 
stressed the fact that Earnest had asserted reliance on his right to cross-
examine Boeglin, consistent with Douglas, throughout the litigation.
394
 
Thus, the disposition in Forbes rests less on doctrinal analysis or concern 
for development of retroactivity principles assuring uniformity in application 
and more on the court‘s perception of the particular unfairness in Earnest‘s 
conviction.  The court carefully maintained its discretion not to announce a 
general doctrinal position on retroactivity with respect to the Crawford rule in 
resolving the precise issue Earnest brought before it.  Moreover, the majority 
opinion clearly suggests that the court believed the Supreme Court had, in 
fact, gotten it wrong in New Mexico v. Earnest in vacating the state court‘s 
reversal of Earnest‘s conviction.  This is evident in the majority‘s conclusion: 
―Our decision is limited to the very special facts of this case, highlighted by 
the fact that the very law this Court applied to Earnest‘s case twenty years ago 
has now been vindicated, which entitles him now to the same new trial he 
should have received back then.‖395 
In fact, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s characterization of 
Crawford as involving restoration of the pre-existing precedent of Douglas v. 
Alabama, rather than announcing a new rule within the Teague framework, 
also proved to be incorrect. 
The New Mexico court did not apply the retroactivity analysis that would 
be expected had Crawford not announced a new rule of constitutional 
criminal procedure.  Had the result in Crawford been dictated by existing 
precedent consistent with the Teague analytical framework,
396
 it would have 
been afforded full retroactive benefit.
397
  The consequence would have been 
 
392. Id. 
393. Id. at 150–51. 
394. Id. at 147 (majority opinion). 
395. Id. at 148–49. 
396. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (―[A] case announces a new rule if the result 
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction was final.‖).  
397. For example, in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), the Court applied the Teague 
approach in concluding that a rule previously applied in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 
(1988), and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), was dictated by existing precedent holding 
that imposition of the death penalty based, in part, on a finding that the capital murder was 
committed in an ―especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel‖ manner was impermissible because of the 
lack of definition for this characterization that would permit jurors to differentiate rationally between 
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dramatic for the criminal justice system because, presumably, all convictions 
resting on admission of uncrossed testimonial statements would have been 
subject to vacation and the cases remanded for new trials.  Of course, this 
presupposes that in each individual case, the defense had preserved error by 
objection to the admission of the statement, and its admission of uncrossed 
statements would have been prejudicial to the defense under the Chapman v. 
California
398
 harmlessness standard.  Under Chapman, the burden is placed on 
the prosecution to demonstrate that constitutional trial error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal.
399
 
The Court‘s view of whether decisions are dictated by existing precedent 
is narrow, and must be, in order to avoid the prospect that all new applications 
of constitutional protections would require review of all prior convictions or 
sentences in which a similar issue had been raised, requiring then a 
preservation and prejudice analysis in each case.  With regard to Crawford 
error, however, the actual number of cases in which relief might ultimately be 
granted would likely be small, if only suggested by the sampling of decisions 
referred to by Justice Scalia in which convictions had been obtained based on 
admission of uncrossed accomplice statements.
400
 
Consequently, the New Mexico court‘s approach is not clearly one of new 
or existing rules analysis based on Teague precisely because the court did not 
hold that its retroactive application of Crawford in Earnest‘s case represented 
a general grant of retroactivity.
401
  Instead, the court tempered its initial 
finding with its second concern—that at the time of Earnest‘s trial, existing 
precedent did preclude admission of Boeglin‘s uncrossed statement to police, 
as it had held in Earnest I, relying on Douglas v. Alabama.
402
 
In this very important sense, the court‘s decision in Forbes is not so much 
about the retroactivity implications of Crawford, but about the fundamental 
fairness of the trial process being compromised by a post-trial decision 
essentially changing the rules of trial in a way that neither Earnest nor trial 
counsel could have reasonably expected when the case was tried. 
A reading of the limited holding in Forbes suggests, therefore, that New 
Mexico defendants tried after the Supreme Court‘s remand in New Mexico v. 
Earnest and the state supreme court‘s application of Ohio v. Roberts in 
Earnest II to uphold the conviction, were not unfairly prejudiced by the 
 
those capital offenses that were committed in such a fashion and other capital offenses that would not 
qualify for imposition of the death penalty.  Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228, 237 (citation omitted). 
398. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
399. Id. at 24. 
400. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–65 (2004) (noting a dozen or so cases); see 
Kirst, supra note 251, at 104–06 (documenting Lilly-based confession claims). 
401. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 148–49 (N.M. 2005). 
402. Id. at 147. 
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Supreme Court‘s temporary abandonment of Douglas.  Instead, they were on 
notice that uncrossed accomplice statements would be admissible if found to 
possess sufficient indications of reliability—the chief indicator being that they 
were made against the accomplice‘s penal interest—and thus defense counsel 
had the opportunity to creatively challenge the reliability analysis or consider 
other tactical options.  Of course, these options were likely proved to be futile 
against the overwhelming power of the admissions made by accomplices 
implicating the defendants on trial. 
V.  BOCKTING AND DANFORTH: RESOLUTION OF CRAWFORD-RELATED 
RETROACTIVITY QUESTIONS 
The resolution of the question of retroactive application of Crawford by 
the United States Supreme Court not only affected litigants raising Crawford-
based confrontation claims, but also generated an additional and far broader 
issue: whether states not only are required to apply retroactive federal 
constitutional rules to benefit state court litigants, but also are bound to afford 
no greater retroactive application than that announced by the Supreme Court. 
A.  The Rejection of Crawford Retroactivity: Whorton v. Bockting 
A unanimous Supreme Court declined to afford Crawford retroactive 
application in addressing the issue squarely in Whorton v. Bockting.
403
  As a 
threshold matter, the Court rejected the position taken by the New Mexico 
Supreme Court that viewed Crawford as a decision restoring a previous rule 
rather than a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure.
404
  Bockting had 
argued in the alternative, relying on both the McKeown
405
 and Noonan 
opinions
406
 in his Ninth Circuit victory.
407
  The Court rejected the restoration 
argument, premised on the argument that Crawford was dictated by precedent, 
first defining its terms: ―A new rule is defined as ‗a rule that . . . was not 
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became 
final.‘‖408  Concluding that Ohio v. Roberts was the existing precedent, it 
 
403. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
404. Id. at 1181. 
405. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (McKeown, J.), rev’d sub 
nom, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).  Judge Wallace, concurring and dissenting, 
agreed with Judge McKeown that Crawford announced a new rule but disagreed that it represented a 
watershed rule warranting retroactive application.  Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1024, 1028–29 (Wallace, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
406. Id. at 1022–24 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
407. Id. at 1020–23 (majority opinion). 
408. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (internal 
citations and quotation omitted)). 
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concluded that Crawford was ―flatly inconsistent‖ with Roberts and, thus, 
could not be dictated by Roberts.
409
 
The Court was certainly correct in this conclusion, but the argument 
advanced by Bockting and Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit was slightly 
different than that argued by Earnest and adopted by the New Mexico court in 
Forbes.  In the Earnest litigation, Crawford is viewed as a corrective ruling 
dictated by the precedent of Douglas v. Alabama.
410
  Justice Scalia‘s own 
admission of error on the part of the Court in departing from the Douglas 
principle in Roberts changed the retroactivity question because, in fact, 
Crawford was dictated by Douglas, Roberts being in error.
411
  Moreover, 
neither Roberts nor certainly Lee v. Illinois
412
 expressly overruled Douglas in 
the process of the erroneous development of confrontation doctrine,
413
 such 
that it is simplistic to say that Roberts was actually the controlling precedent 
for Crawford‘s claim at all. 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia observed that the Court had consistently 
looked to cross-examination in the admissibility analysis for out-of-court 
statements, pointing out the Court‘s exclusion of uncrossed accomplice 
confessions: 
 
We similarly excluded accomplice confessions where the 
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine.  See Roberts 
v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294–295 (1968) (per curiam); 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126–128 (1968); 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–420 (1965).  In 
contrast, we considered reliability factors beyond prior 
opportunity for cross-examination when the hearsay 
statement at issue was not testimonial.
414
 
 
In fact, the Court had never expressly approved the admission of a non-
testifying accomplice‘s confession as direct evidence against the accused 
without some opportunity for cross-examination.  In Roberts, the testimony 
was given by a witness, not an accomplice, in a preliminary hearing where she 
had been subjected to cross-examination;
415
 in Lee, the conviction was 
reversed based on the improper admission of the accomplice‘s statement.416  
 
409. Id. 
410. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005). 
411. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–63 (2004). 
412. 476 U.S. 530 (1985). 
413. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
414. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. 
415. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
416. Lee, 476 U.S. at 538–39. 
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Only in Tennessee v. Street
417
 had the uncrossed statement been properly 
admitted according to the Court, and then only for purposes of impeachment 
of the defendant‘s trial testimony, which included his claim that his own 
confession had been coerced.
418
  The majority distinguished prior decisions 
that had addressed admissibility of uncrossed statements as substantive 
evidence.
419
  The Court held that the use of the accomplice‘s statement to 
rebut the accused‘s claim that his own confession had been coerced did not 
violate Street‘s right to confrontation because the defense was able to cross-
examine the sheriff who had elicited his statement
420
 and jurors were 
instructed as to the limited purpose for which the statement had been 
admitted.
421
 
Of particular significance in the new rule analysis is the fact that 
Crawford involved admission of an accomplice‘s statement, traditionally 
viewed with suspicion,
422
 while Bockting involved the admission of a child‘s 
report of abuse, the kind of statement that the Court has not traditionally 
viewed as inherently suspect.
423
 
Consequently, a conclusion that Crawford was dictated by precedent 
would have had dramatic consequences because it would have reopened for 
review all state and federal convictions obtained by prosecutors offering 
uncrossed testimonial statements.  This would have not only included those 
statements made to police by accomplices, but also, as the litigation history 
 
417. 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
418. Id. at 417.  However, the accomplice‘s confession was clearly inculpatory as to the 
accused, referring to him as an actual participant in the hanging of the victim, which the accused 
denied.  Id. at 412.  The trial court instructed the jury that it could only consider the statement as 
rebuttal to the defendant‘s denial of participation in the offense, id., but the state court had concluded 
that its admission violated Street‘s right to confrontation, State v. Street, 674 S.W.2d 741, 746–47 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).  It found that it was likely the jurors would consider the accomplice‘s 
statement as substantive evidence of the actual events surrounding the murder.  Id. 
419. Street, 471 U.S. at 413. 
420. Id. at 414. 
421. Id. at 414–15.  The Court also noted the difficulty in proving that the confession was not 
coerced without reliance on the confession given by the accomplice.  Id. at 415.  The prosecutor used 
the accomplice‘s confession essentially to corroborate admissions made in the defendant‘s own 
confession and then pointed to additional facts included in the defendant‘s confession that arguably 
could only have been known by someone participating in the murder.  Id. at 411–12.  The Court did 
not discuss the traditionally ―suspect‖ nature of accomplice statements, which might have required 
consideration of whether the accomplice had reason to implicate the defendant, inducing him to 
confess.  The defendant claimed the sheriff read the contents of the accomplice‘s statement to him 
and then pressured him to confess, but the sheriff denied having done so.  Id. at 411.  The 
accomplice‘s possible motive in identifying Street in the commission of the murder, however, could 
have related to his own interest in minimizing his involvement in the crime, warranting concern that 
it was suspect for that reason. 
422. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
423. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1992). 
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following Crawford demonstrates, the entire range of statements admitted as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule that could be fairly characterized as testimonial 
in nature.
424
 
The Bockting Court could have fashioned a rule affording retroactive 
application to Crawford cases based upon the admission of accomplice 
statements and their traditional characterization as unreliable, but it could not 
fashion a general rule based upon Crawford‘s rejection of Ohio v. Roberts 
with regard to testimonial statements without affording broader relief than the 
facts in Crawford would have required.  Had the Crawford Court recognized 
that its rule was dictated by the precedent of Douglas v. Alabama, it could 
have achieved this result without disturbing convictions resting on non-
accomplice testimonial statements admitted without opportunity for cross-
examination.  But the text of Crawford is not strictly limited to the 
consideration of accomplice statements, the narrow constitutional context 
presented by Crawford‘s fact scenario.425  Rather, Justice Scalia was 
interested in discrediting the doctrinal approach of Ohio v. Roberts, and, in so 
doing, those individuals convicted on the uncrossed statements of 
accomplices, traditionally recognized as inherently suspect, were eventually 
denied relief when the issue of retroactivity came before the Court in 
Bockting.
426
 
Having rejected the argument that Crawford was dictated by precedent 
and thus did not announce a new rule, the Court avoided the sweeping 
retroactivity application that would have required extensive review of 
probably hundreds, if not thousands, of convictions.  The Bockting Court was 
left to decide whether Crawford should be applied retroactively based on the 
second Teague exception to its rule of non-retroactivity.
427
  The Teague Court 
had explained that the class of rules fitting within the second exception is that 
which ensures fundamental fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding 
process.
428
 
The Bockting Court did not find that Crawford represented the kind of 
rule that is central to the accuracy of the fact-finding function.
429
  Justice Alito 
noted language from Crawford describing the confrontation guarantee: ―To be 
sure, the Clause‘s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands not that evidence 
 
424. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (discussing the admissibility of 911 
emergency call messages); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing cases suggesting the 
range of testimonial statements). 
425. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
426. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007). 
427. Id. at 1181. 
428. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311–12 (1989). 
429. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183. 
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be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.‖430  The second Teague exception does not 
exclude procedural rules, of course; rather, it embraces process instead of 
substance.
431
  That Crawford involved a procedural rule, a mechanism 
implicating the fairness of the trial process, should not have doomed it to non-
retroactivity under the second exception at all. 
In considering the impact of Crawford in light of the watershed rule 
exception, the Court relied on its prior view that this type of rule is extremely 
rare
432
 and unlikely to be discerned.
433
  In fact, the Court noted: ―[I]n the years 
since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the 
requirements for watershed status.‖434  Given the Court‘s admitted history, it 
was hardly surprising that it would find that Crawford did not meet the 
requirements for a watershed rule under the second Teague exception. 
The Court then explained that the watershed rule exception must meet two 
requirements,
435
 applying its analysis in Schriro v. Summerlin,
436
 where it had 
declined to apply Ring v. Arizona
437
 retroactively.  Even though Ring required 
that a jury determination of aggravating circumstances is necessary for the 
imposition of a death sentence retroactively to death sentences obtained on 
findings made by trial judges, instead of capital sentencing juries,
438
 the 
Summerlin Court rejected the argument that capital sentencing fact-finding by 
judges, rather than jurors, did not compromise the integrity of the sentences 
imposed.
439
  First, it must address a procedure that carries with it an 
―impermissibly large risk‖ of an inaccurate conviction.440  Second, it must 
―‗alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the 
fairness of a proceeding.‘‖441 
 
430. Id. at 1179 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61). 
431. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12. 
432. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (stating that the exception is ―extremely 
narrow‖). 
433. Id. (citing Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001)). 
434. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181–82 (emphasis added). 
435. Id. at 1182. 
436. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
437. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
438. Id. 
439. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 356.  The Summerlin Court held that capital sentences imposed 
upon judicial finding of aggravating circumstances do not carry an ―impermissibly large risk‖ of an 
inaccurate conviction.  Id. 
440. See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
441. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 
227, 242 (1990)). 
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The Court then explained that its notion of a watershed rule is the type of 
rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,
442
 which required the provision of 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants and which, the Court admitted, has 
repeatedly been relied on by the Court to supply guidance in its analysis of 
rules claimed to satisfy the requirements of the second Teague exception.
443
  
Of course, virtually no rule could meet the profound implications of Gideon 
for the criminal justice system, and that reality dominates the Bockting 
Court‘s conclusion: ―The Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the 
Gideon rule.  The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the 
relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the fact finding process is far less 
direct and profound.‖444  But in its insistence on minimizing the import of 
Crawford for the fact-finding process, the Court made an unreasonable leap of 
faith, misinterpreting the meaning of its holding in Crawford. 
Justice Alito characterized Crawford as involving a rejection of doctrinal 
analysis in Ohio v. Roberts based on its theoretical inconsistency with 
historical notions of cross-examination as central to the confrontation right.
445
  
That characterization is no doubt correct, but only in part.  To the extent that 
Crawford revitalized Douglas and the similarly sound traditional view that 
accomplice statements are inherently suspect and thus not inherently 
trustworthy, that aspect of Crawford addresses the very heart of accuracy in 
the fact-finding process.  But in viewing Crawford as essentially doctrinally 
correct, Justice Alito misses this aspect of the significance of the holding 
based on the precise facts of Crawford.  Justice Alito notes: ―Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that the overall effect of Crawford with regard to the 
accuracy of fact-finding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.‖446  When one 
looks to the fact that Crawford involved admission of an uncrossed 
accomplice statement, it is apparent that the difficulty in assessing the ―overall 
effect of Crawford with regard to the accuracy of fact-finding‖ is not simply 
the result of admission without cross-examination, but rather, the unreliability 
of the statements of accomplices.
447
 
With regard to these inherently suspect and presumably untrustworthy 
statements, the threat to the accuracy of fact-finding is implicit in their 
admission without testing by cross-examination and, preferably, before the 
jury.  In contrast, the general doctrinal change accomplished by Crawford 
does not so readily suggest impairment of fact-finding precisely because 
 
442. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
443. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1182. 
444. Id. 
445. Id. at 1179. 
446. Id. at 1183. 
447. Id. 
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hearsay statements made by witnesses who are not accomplices are not 
inherently suspect.  Because they are often admitted based upon long-standing 
appreciation for their likely reliability and trustworthiness, admission of these 
statements without the opportunity for cross-examination may often suggest 
no compromise of the integrity of the fact-finding process. 
Justice Alito concluded, however, that because no uncrossed statements 
would have been admissible under the Roberts framework without a reliability 
determination, there is little chance that Crawford actually contributes to 
reliability at all.
448
  This is quite logical and probably correct with respect to 
all statements except those of accomplices for which the reliability assessment 
was based upon the fact that these statements were against the penal interests 
of the declarants.  The status of the declarant as an accomplice, however, 
suggests that all statements implicating others in the commission of the 
offense may be the product of some instinct or plan to shift blame or better the 
position of the declarant through controlled and limited cooperation with the 
authorities.
449
 
Returning to Gideon, Justice Alito then concluded that while Crawford is 
important, it certainly does not have similar character in terms of a ―bedrock 
procedural element[] that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.‖450  Of 
course, using Gideon as the benchmark for assessment does place virtually 
every other procedural rule beyond the scope of watershed status precisely 
because Gideon affects every criminal prosecution in which felony 
punishment may be imposed.  But it does not necessarily contribute at all to 
the accuracy of the fact-finding process in even a majority of cases tried; 
assistance of a lawyer does not guarantee a more accurate verdict in those 
cases because defendants are overwhelmingly convicted at trial even when 
represented by lawyers.  In contrast, however, admission of accomplice 
statements untested by cross-examination threatens the reliability of fact-
finding in all but those cases in which the evidence is overwhelming. 
The Court was certainly correct in finding that Crawford does not carry 
the same implications as Gideon in terms of our overall understanding of 
fundamental fairness in the conduct of the criminal trial.
451
  And it is also 
correct in its reasoning that it is unlikely that comparable ―rights‖ remain to 
be discerned that will command retroactive application under the second 
Teague exception.
452
 
 
448. Id. 
449. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
450. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183 (internal quotations omitted). 
451. See id. at 1183–84. 
452. See id. at 1181. 
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But the factual context of Crawford cannot be ignored, particularly in 
contrast to the broader range of hearsay implicated by Bockting.  With regard 
to the specific hearsay admitted at trial in the latter—and certainly the broader 
range of non-testimonial hearsay routinely admitted under ―firmly rooted 
exceptions to the hearsay rule‖—the Court‘s analysis is undoubtedly 
correct.
453
  This analysis, however, ignores the very difficult subset of 
testimonial hearsay that involves uncrossed accomplice statements to police. 
Thus, it is somewhat unfortunate for proponents of retroactivity that the 
determination as to Crawford was made on the basis of far less threatening 
hearsay of the type considered in Bockting, rather than in the context of a 
comparable fact situation in which the hearsay involved an accomplice‘s 
confession to police.  In this respect, the New Mexico court‘s approach in 
Forbes serves the interests of justice far better than might have been 
anticipated because it affords relief based upon the dual considerations of fair 
notice as to the rules of admission of evidence at the time of trial and the 
actual prejudice to a defendant whose conviction rests on evidence ultimately 
repudiated by the Supreme Court.  However, Forbes was never addressed by 
the Bockting Court at all,
454
 perhaps because it represented creative judicial 
decision making not accommodated by the Teague framework.  Ironically, 
Teague has come to dominate this central aspect of the Court‘s constitutional 
criminal jurisprudence while resting only on a plurality opinion.
455
 
In explaining the grant of certiorari, Justice Alito looked to the conflicting 
positions taken by the Ninth Circuit and ―every other Court of Appeals and 
State Supreme Court that has addressed this issue.‖456  The Court inexplicably 
ignored the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s decision in Forbes, in which 
Crawford was afforded retroactive effect.
457
  This omission may well have 
been inadvertent, but the fact that the decision in Forbes was published and 
that the New Mexico attorney general applied for certiorari to review the state 
court‘s decision458 would suggest that the omission was, in fact, deliberate.  
 
453. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134. 
454. See generally Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173. 
455. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  Justice O‘Connor wrote the Court‘s opinion, 
which was joined by only three other Justices. 
456. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1180 n.4. 
457. In a similar vein of irony, the Crawford Court never addressed the order vacating 
Earnest‘s conviction in New Mexico v. Earnest nor Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring statement in that 
case.  New Mexicans frequently complain that the state is often not recognized as a part of the United 
States, and New Mexico Magazine has carried a column titled ―One of Our Fifty is Missing‖ for 
years.  See generally One of Our 50 Is Missing, N.M. MAGAZINE, available at 
http://www.nmmagazine.com/50missing.php.  Perhaps this explains the Court‘s lack of recognition 
of the Earnest litigation. 
458. See New Mexico v. Forbes, 127 S. Ct. 1482 (2007) (denying New Mexico‘s petition for 
writ of certiorari).  The case was circulated within the U.S. Supreme Court for conference three times 
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Moreover, the State‘s petition was not disposed of in routine fashion; instead, 
the case was carried on the docket until the Court issued its decision in 
Bockting, despite the fact that the issue presented had been rendered moot
459
 
when the charges against Earnest were dismissed in September 2006.
460
 
The Court‘s treatment of the attorney general‘s petition in Forbes suggests 
that the state supreme court‘s judgment would have been vacated and the case 
remanded for reconsideration in light of Whorton v. Bockting once the 
decision in Bockting had been entered.  Earnest escaped this possible result, 
which would have been the second time the Supreme Court would have 
vacated relief afforded him by the New Mexico Supreme Court, by 
successfully objecting to the State‘s motion to recall the mandate.461  When 
that court declined to recall its mandate,
462
 the case was returned to the district 
court‘s trial docket.463  Later, when the case was called for trial—before the 
Supreme Court acted on the pending certiorari petition—the State was unable 
to announce ready for trial because Boeglin refused to testify, accepting a 
contempt finding by the trial court rather than taking the stand.
464
 
B.  Danforth v. Minnesota and the Final Piece of the Retroactivity Puzzle: 
Recognition of State Court Discretion in Expanding upon Teague in 
Retroactive Application of New Rules 
Bockting declared that Crawford constituted a new rule not retroactively 
applicable to benefit defendants in either state or federal proceedings whose 
trials had included prosecution reliance on uncrossed, testimonial 
statements.
465
  But the question left unresolved there has now been answered 
in Danforth v. Minnesota.
466
  Following Danforth, state courts are free to give 
retroactive effect to Crawford and other decisions of the Court announcing 
 
after Earnest filed his Brief in Opposition. 
459. Earnest filed a Suggestion of Mootness on October 17, 2006, based on dismissal of the 
charges that were pending on remand from the state supreme court as a result of its decision granting 
relief from his conviction.  Nevertheless, the case was carried on the Court‘s docket until the State‘s 
petition was denied on March 5, 2007, after the case was again distributed for the Court‘s March 2nd 
conference.  Order List of Summary Dispositions (Mar. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/030507pzor.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).  The 
Court issued its opinion in Bockting on February 28, 2007.  Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1173. 
460. Audio tape: Pre-Trial Proceedings, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author). 
461. New Mexico v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Sept. 21, 2005) (order denying motion to recall 
mandate); Mandate No. 29,111 (N.M. Aug. 26, 2005). 
462. New Mexico v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Nov. 22, 2005) (order denying renewed motion 
to recall mandate). 
463. Mandate No. 29,111 (N.M. Aug. 26, 2005). 
464. Audio tape: Pre-Trial Proceedings, supra note 460. 
465. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181–84 (2007). 
466. 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008). 
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new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure, consistent with their 
own retroactivity doctrines.
467
 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Danforth, put the question 
succinctly and then answered it directly: ―The question in this case is whether 
Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new 
rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion.  We have never 
suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not.‖468  Thus, the Teague 
new rules doctrine does not reach beyond basic principles of federalism to bar 
states from determining that federal constitutional protections should be 
applied retroactively, consistent with state law principles.
469
 
1.  Danforth‘s Claim in the State Courts 
Danforth argued in his post-conviction claim in the Minnesota courts that 
Crawford should be applied retroactively to afford him relief from his 
conviction obtained, in part, on the admission of a videotaped interview of the 
complainant in a child sexual assault case.
470
  The taped interview included a 
description of the assault by the complainant, a six-year-old boy found 
incompetent to testify by the trial court due to his inability to respond to 
questioning, as well as his five-year-old sister, whom the court did find 
competent to testify to events involving her brother and the accused.
471
 
The trial court admitted the videotape, finding that it bore sufficient 
indicia of reliability to warrant admission, including the fact that the child‘s 
statements ―appeared spontaneous and largely unsolicited by leading 
questions‖ and that the complainant ―lacked any apparent motivation to 
fabricate the accusation.‖472  The appellate court agreed with this assessment, 
noting that Minnesota applied the Idaho v. Wright formula for determining 
reliability—a showing of ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‖473—
when determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible in the 
absence of cross-examination.
474
  Of course, this is the same test articulated in 
Ohio v. Roberts.
475
 
 
467. See id. at 1033. 
468. Id. 
469. The majority rejected the position taken by the dissent that the articulation of principles of 
federal constitutional criminal procedure is a matter of the Court‘s discretion, binding on the states 
through the Supremacy Clause.  Id. at 1048 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
470. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 530–31 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
471. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
472. Id. 
473. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990). 
474. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375. 
475. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
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Danforth could have logically argued that Crawford had repudiated the 
application of the ―particularlized guarantees of trustworthiness‖ test for 
admission of the videotaped interview, rather than deposition, of his child 
accuser in the sense that the interview itself was made with a clear eye toward 
its use in litigation.  In fact, the recorded interview was made in accordance 
with a Minnesota statute expressly authorizing the admission of this type of 
interview in evidence,
476
 as the court itself noted.
477
  The state supreme court 
denied review,
478
 and Danforth‘s initial round of post-conviction litigation 
was unsuccessful. 
However, after the Court issued its decision in Crawford, Danforth again 
applied for state post-conviction relief, arguing retroactive application of 
Crawford as a basis for setting aside his conviction.
479
  The Minnesota Court 
of Appeals denied relief, holding that Crawford announced a new rule and 
one not subject to Teague‘s exceptions to the general rule of non-
retroactivity.
480
  That court also concluded that the approaches taken by all 
federal circuits other than the Ninth in Bockting v. Bayer were more 
persuasive on the question of whether Crawford fit within one of the Teague 
exceptions.
481
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court then addressed the issue of Crawford 
retroactivity decided adversely to Danforth by the intermediate court.
482
  
Danforth argued that regardless of whether Crawford applied retroactively as 
a matter of due process because it announced a new rule fitting within either 
of the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity, the state courts were free to 
apply Supreme Court precedent retroactively.
483
  The supreme court rejected 
Danforth‘s argument,484 relying on its decision in State v. Houston485 where 
the court had held that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Blakely v. 
Washington
486
 could not be applied retroactively absent an express declaration 
requiring retroactive application by the United States Supreme Court.
487
  The 
 
476. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (2008). 
477. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375. 
478. Id. at 369 (noting review denied by Minnesota Supreme Court on February 19, 1998). 
479. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
480. Id. at 532. 
481. Id. 
482. See Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Minn. 2006). 
483. Id. at 455.  The court observed that Danforth raised the question of the state court‘s 
authority to apply Crawford retroactively despite the fact that it would not qualify for retroactive 
application under Teague for the first time in his appeal to the state supreme court.  Id.  Nevertheless, 
the court addressed the issue ―in the interests of justice.‖  Id. 
484. Id. 
485. 702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005). 
486. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
487. See Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 274. 
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Houston court, however, did not hold that Teague forbids retroactive 
application of federal constitutional new rules by state courts.
488
  Instead, the 
court rejected the arguments that the limitations imposed upon sentencing 
discretion by Blakely
489
 fit within Teague‘s exceptions.490 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in O’Meara v. State had articulated its 
understanding of the mandatory nature of Teague when dealing with the duty 
to apply federal constitutional new rules announced by the United States 
Supreme Court.
491
  But the court there did not address the question ultimately 
raised by Danforth: whether Minnesota courts could apply a new rule 
retroactively as a matter of state law or policy when the Supreme Court did 
not expressly provide for retroactive application as a matter of federal due 
process.
492
  It did, however, hold that because O‘Meara‘s case was not final 
when the Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey493 was announced, he 
would be entitled to the benefit of that holding based on the requirement that 
even new rules are applicable to issues raised in pending litigation not final at 
the time the Court announces its decision.
494
  It also made an interesting 
observation that would later prove somewhat ironic in the context of 
Danforth: ―It is axiomatic that as Minnesota‘s highest court we determine 
whether our decisions on state law are given retroactive or prospective 
effect.‖495  It did so, explaining its own doctrine of retroactivity for state law 
decisions that parallels the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Griffith v. 
Kentucky.
496
 
What is clear is that the Minnesota Supreme Court could have based its 
rejection of Danforth‘s claim by electing to apply a state retroactivity rule 
paralleling Teague.  In fact, a substantial number of jurisdictions had done 
precisely that, adopting Teague as the formula for retroactivity analysis under 
state law, although apparently conceding that Teague is not mandatory.
497
  
 
488. See id. at 271–74. 
489. Blakely held that enhanced sentences based upon particular circumstances require 
pleading and proof of those factors warranting increased sentences by the trier of fact, applying the 
principle of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), to certain sentencing discretion 
traditionally exercised by trial judges within statutory frameworks.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
490. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 271–74. 
491. 679 N.W.2d 334, 339–40 (Minn. 2004). 
492. See id. at 338–40. 
493. 530 U.S. at 490. 
494. O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 340. 
495. Id. at 338. 
496. See id. at 338–39 (referring to Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)). 
497. See, e.g., Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 981–82 (Colo. 2006) (recognizing the 
possibility that Teague does not bind the states, then circumventing the problem by deciding as a 
matter of state law to apply the Teague rule); People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674, 682 (Ill. 1990) 
(adopting Teague as a matter of state law); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 81–82 (Iowa 1989) 
(same); State v. Tallard, 816 A.2d 977, 979–81 (N.H. 2003) (also recognizing the possibility that 
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Had the court taken this approach, Danforth‘s petition would not have raised a 
federal constitutional claim warranting review by the Court. 
Instead, however, the Minnesota court framed its decision in terms of 
limitation on its own authority,
498
 squarely raising an issue of federalism.  The 
court‘s approach was consistent with the position taken by other state courts 
holding that they were bound by Teague‘s retroactivity principles and barred 
from affording relief to state court inmates whose convictions were final 
based on Supreme Court decisions announcing new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure
499
 or that have deferred to Teague as controlling.
500
  The 
Danforth Court noted, however, that other state courts had not considered 
state retroactivity principles to be controlled by Teague.
501
 
2.  The Supreme Court‘s Disposition of Danforth‘s Claim 
The Supreme Court rejected the state supreme court‘s analysis in 
providing Danforth with an initial victory in his pursuit of relief from 
conviction through retroactive application of Crawford‘s restored 
commitment to cross-examination.
502
  Instead, the majority rejected the 
argument that federal due process requires a nationally consistent application 
 
Teague does not bind the states, then circumventing the problem by deciding as a matter of state law 
to apply the Teague rule). 
498. See Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455–56 (Minn. 2006). 
499. E.g., State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 267 (Mont. 1995); Page v. Palmateer, 84 P.3d 133, 
137–38 (Or. 2004) (holding state court was not ―free to determine the degree to which a new rule of 
federal constitutional law should be applied retroactively‖); State v. Gómez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 650–
51 (Tenn. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1209 (2007). 
500. E.g., Johnson v. Warden, 591 A.2d 407, 410 (Conn. 1991); Whisler v. State, 36 P.3d 290, 
296 (Kan. 2001); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 464–65 (N.Y. 1995); Agee v. Russell, 751 
N.E.2d 1043, 1046–47 (Ohio 2001); Thomas v. State, 888 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 780 (Pa. 2004); Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000). 
501. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008) (citing State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d 
1280, 1292 (N.J. 1992) (explaining that comity and federalism concerns ―simply do not apply when 
this Court reviews procedural rulings by our lower courts‖)); id. at 1042 (stating that ―for many years 
following Teague, state courts almost universally understood the Teague rule as binding only federal 
habeas courts, not state courts‖) (citing Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280; Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 
514 (S.D. 1990); State v. Murphy, 548 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Wis. 1996) (choosing of its own volition to 
adopt Teague)).  The Court also noted commentary arguing that Teague should not be considered 
binding on state retroactivity doctrines.  Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1042 (citing Mary C. Hutton, 
Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. 
L. REV. 421, 422–24 (1993)).  Professor Hutton argued that ―Teague‘s foundation is statutory and 
prudential; it is not constitutional.  Moreover, its restrictions apply only to federal habeas cases, 
leaving states the opportunity to follow Teague or to develop an approach to retroactivity which 
enables them to fulfill the requirements of their state constitutions, statutes, and case law.‖  Hutton, 
supra, at 423–24 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Hutton‘s perceptive analysis was affirmed by the 
Court‘s disposition and reasoning fifteen years later in Danforth.  See generally Danforth, 128 S. Ct. 
1029. 
502. See Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1046–47. 
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of retroactivity principles with regard to newly announced interpretations of 
constitutional protections.
503
  However, the Court certainly did not ensure that 
Minnesota would adopt the broader doctrine of retroactivity for its decisions 
that its holding in Danforth permits, precisely because the majority‘s holding 
affords Minnesota and all other states the option of formulating or applying 
retroactivity doctrines that deviate from the Court‘s retroactivity doctrine 
articulated in Teague. 
Thus, having freed state courts from the constraint of mandatory 
application of the Teague retroactivity principle as a rule binding on states and 
applied to limit their discretion to afford broader retroactivity than that 
ordered by the Court when appropriate under the Teague exceptions, the issue 
facing state courts following Danforth is twofold.  First, state courts remain 
free to fashion their retroactivity doctrines to conform strictly to Teague and 
may now elect to do so.  And second, if they elect to do so, they must decide 
what principles may guide them in the exercise of the discretion afforded by 
Danforth. 
The Danforth Court‘s rejection of the Minnesota court‘s conclusion that 
Teague limited its authority to apply Crawford retroactively effectively opens 
the door for state courts to determine when state inmates whose convictions 
are final may benefit from newly announced rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure.
504
  It also permits state courts to fashion retroactivity doctrines that 
may recognize limited retroactivity based on factors viewed as critical in the 
determination of whether retroactive application of a new rule is necessary to 
achieve justice, much as the New Mexico Supreme Court did in affording 
Earnest relief in Forbes.
505
 
 
503. See id. at 1033. 
504. This result in Danforth is consistent with the position advocated by a number of states 
joining in the filing of an amicus brief in the case.  See Brief of Kansas and the Amici States in 
Support of Neither Party at 3, Danforth, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (No. 06-8273), 2007 WL 2088650, where 
their attorneys general took the position that Teague does not control state retroactivity doctrine: 
 
There is no constitutional command that the States follow federal habeas corpus 
doctrines such as the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989).  Nor is there a constitutional bar to the States developing their own 
retroactivity doctrines for state post-conviction proceedings, whether those 
doctrines are broader or stricter than a federal habeas counterpart such as 
Teague.  So long as state courts make that decision as a matter of state law, 
there is no federal interest nor federal constitutional principle at stake (italics 
added). 
505. See supra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s retroactivity 
analysis applied in State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005). 
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3.  The New Mexico Supreme Court‘s Approach in Earnest 
While the New Mexico Supreme Court afforded Earnest relief based on its 
reading of the confrontation principle affirmed in Crawford, it did not adopt a 
general retroactive application approach to Crawford claims in state cases.
506
  
Instead, it fashioned a ruling based upon limited retroactivity, rather than 
formulating a general rule applicable to all Crawford claims.
507
  Arguably, in 
doing so, the court intended that only Earnest among all New Mexico litigants 
would ever benefit from this ruling.  Of course, the holding itself left the court 
the option of extending the benefit of this approach to any other similarly 
situated state defendant.  Thus, another New Mexico defendant who is able to 
show that counsel had relied on Douglas v. Alabama at trial in objecting to the 
admission of a non-testifying accomplice‘s confession never subjected to 
testing by cross-examination would presumably be permitted to claim Forbes 
as precedent in a state post-conviction action.  However, there may simply be 
no similarly situated defendant for whom relief would be available. 
Danforth leaves open the option for state courts to fashion limited, rather 
than general, rules of retroactivity.  For example, a state court might hold that 
only certain classes of statements, such as accomplice confessions, would be 
considered for retroactive application of Crawford because other hearsay 
declarations do not pose such a serious potential for falsity based upon the 
declarant‘s self-interest.  Similarly, even if a class of statements might be 
subject to retroactive application of Crawford‘s cross-examination 
requirement, a state court might elect to limit those circumstances in which 
relief is granted, as most claims of constitutional error are subject to harm 
analysis.
508
 
A number of circumstances defined the New Mexico court‘s approach in 
applying Crawford retroactively for Earnest‘s benefit.  First, the court did not 
elect to apply Crawford retroactively in all cases in which ―testimonial 
 
506. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148. 
507. See id. 
508. Some constitutional claims involve matters of structural error that cannot be subjected to 
analysis for harm precisely because harm cannot be assessed in light of the trial record.  For instance, 
claims of improper exclusion of jurors based on ethnicity, see generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), or attitudes toward capital punishment, see generally Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510 (1968), are not susceptible to prejudice analysis because it is impossible to accurately assess 
the behavior of a jury had the excluded juror been seated and served.  Similarly, in Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Court held that a constitutionally defective jury instruction that 
impermissibly altered the burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution in a criminal case 
constituted ―structural error‖ not amenable to prejudice analysis.  Any attempt to assess harm would 
require speculation on consequences of the error that would be ―unquantifiable and indeterminate.‖  
Id. at 281–82.  Trial error claims, or those that occur ―during the presentation of the case to the jury, 
and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented,‖ are 
evaluated in terms of prejudice to the accused.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991). 
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hearsay‖ had been admitted without cross-examination, restricting its 
application to Earnest‘s case.509  A state court could clearly fashion relief in 
this way, or by affording retroactive application only to convictions resting on 
inherently suspect testimonial statements given by accomplices.  Second, the 
claimed confrontation violation in the denial of cross-examination was clearly 
asserted at trial and in all subsequent proceedings in the state and federal 
courts.
510
  And third, as the state supreme court concluded in its initial 
decision reversing the conviction, Boeglin‘s statement was prejudicial, 
particularly because it was the only evidence the prosecution had linking 
Earnest to the Eastman murder.
511
 
The analysis in Earnest thus fits within reasonable parameters for 
retroactive application of Crawford.  Where the conviction itself rests on 
evidence that would be excluded were the new rule articulated in a decision of 
the Supreme Court, as in Earnest, a state court could reasonably fashion a 
limited remedy designed to correct the manifest injustice inherent in the 
conviction as a matter of state law.  That formulation would be insulated from 
federal constitutional attack in light of Danforth. 
In Forbes, the New Mexico court noted two compelling considerations 
supporting its decision to afford Earnest the retroactive benefit of Crawford.  
First, the court had already determined that the admission of Boeglin‘s 
confession had been found to be prejudicial in the original direct appeal.
512
  
Second, the court found the fact that at the time of Earnest‘s trial, Douglas v. 
Alabama was the controlling Supreme Court precedent, relied upon by 
Earnest‘s trial counsel and on his direct appeal.513  Only when the Supreme 
Court vacated the state court‘s reversal of Earnest‘s conviction was that rule 
governing admission of co-defendant confessions undermined, influenced 
strongly by Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring opinion.514  Thus, the rules for trial 
changed after the fact and without any possibility for trial counsel to have 
advised Earnest and represented him at trial with reasonable knowledge that 
he could not rely on Douglas in the preparation of the defense. 
The decision in Forbes represents a reasonable alternative for state courts 
concerned that new constitutional doctrine undermines the credibility of state 
court convictions obtained under now-discarded precedent.  Where the 
conviction itself appears to have been undermined by the recognition of a new 
 
509. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 145. 
510. The Forbes court noted: ―To aid our analysis, it is significant that Earnest preserved his 
argument that admission of the accomplice statement to police officers without him having the 
benefit of cross-examination violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers.‖  Id. at 147. 
511. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985). 
512. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146 (citing Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876). 
513. Id. at 147. 
514. Id. 
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rule articulated by the Supreme Court, nothing would appear to bar a state 
court from granting relief for those defendants for whom relief is deemed 
appropriate, regardless of whether the state is free to apply federal 
constitutional decisions retroactively.  In fact, given the choice between an 
absolute policy of nonretroactivity or the freedom to fashion retroactivity 
doctrine that would require uniform retroactive application of new rules as a 
matter of state process, state courts might well prefer the New Mexico 
approach.  Review of prior convictions called into question by new rules of 
federal constitutional criminal procedure and a prejudice or harm assessment 
of the implication of the new rule for the underlying conviction itself would 
afford state courts the freedom to ―do justice to each litigant on the merits of 
his own case.‖515 
VI.  CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 
In one of the earliest post-Douglas decisions of the Court addressing the 
confrontation right, California v. Green,
516
 Justice White succinctly described 
the significance of cross-examination in the context of admission of a 
declarant‘s out-of-court statements for purposes of impeachment: 
 
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude 
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a 
declarant‘s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is 
testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-
examination. 
 
This conclusion is supported by comparing the 
purposes of confrontation with the alleged dangers in 
admitting an out-of-court statement.  Confrontation: (1) 
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—
thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and 
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for 
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, 
the ―greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth‖; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant‘s 
fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his 
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
517
 
 
This endorsement of cross-examination as the primary tool available to 
the accused to test the prosecution‘s case in the course of trial underlies the 
 
515. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
516. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
517. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted). 
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Crawford Court‘s recommitment to the ―greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth,‖ in the words of Dean Wigmore,518 quoted by 
Justice White.
519
 
Earnest‘s relief from his twenty-four-year-old murder conviction is 
something of a testament to the inherent value of judicial review as a means of 
correcting error in interpretation and application of law.  On the other hand, 
he spent a considerable period of his life waiting for the vindication that 
ultimately came with the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s willingness to fashion 
a rule drawing from both the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Crawford and its 
own innate concern for fundamental fairness.
520
 
Danforth confirms the New Mexico court‘s exercise of discretion as valid 
in constitutional terms in applying Crawford retroactively as a matter of state 
retroactivity doctrine or policy.  Other state courts may well decide to follow 
the lead of the Forbes court in light of Danforth, but it is far from clear that 
many state defendants will actually benefit from the liberality of the Court‘s 
affirmation of judicial federalism in Danforth.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
may opt to apply Teague‘s retroactivity approach on remand as the Danforth 
Court itself noted in remanding: ―[T]he Minnesota Court is free to reinstate its 
judgment disposing of the petition for state postconviction relief.‖521 
Clearly, in the wake of Danforth, state courts will address applications for 
post-conviction relief arguing for retroactive application of Crawford and 
other favorable decisions of the United States Supreme Court announcing 
new, but not retroactive, rules of constitutional criminal procedure.  Although 
the Court‘s holding in Danforth will necessarily make assertion of claims 
based on those attractive to state inmates, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
state courts will generally be unresponsive, or at least cautious, about 
expanding the scope of post-conviction litigation.  The New Mexico court‘s 
approach in the Earnest litigation will likely prove instructive.  The state court 
did not apply Crawford retroactively for the benefit of New Mexico 
 
518. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (rev. ed. 1974). 
519. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
520. The state supreme court‘s clear perception of its role in advancing the interest of justice 
has been demonstrated in the development of state law doctrines that recognize the authority of the 
court to exercise flexibility in discretion in fashioning relief when warranted by the facts of 
individual cases.  See, e.g., State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 797 (N.M. 1996) (asserting authority to 
impose bar to successive prosecutions necessitated by prosecutorial misconduct).  Similarly, the New 
Mexico courts have evidenced a willingness to adopt broader interpretations of rights accorded as a 
matter of state constitutional law than those afforded by federal protections.  See generally State v. 
Gomez, 932 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1997) (construing search and seizure rights under the New Mexico 
Constitution).  New Mexico also recognizes fundamental and plain error doctrines.  See State v. 
Orosco, 833 P.2d 1146, 1150 (N.M. 1992). 
521. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1047 (2008). 
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defendants.
522
  Rather, it grounded its holding in the concept of fairness in 
terms of notice of controlling law at the time of trial.
523
  Thus far, apparently
 
522. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 148 (N.M. 2005). 
523. See id. at 147–49. 
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only Earnest, whose lawyers had preserved error at trial and consistently 
argued for cross-examination in the appellate and post-conviction processes, 
has received the benefit of Crawford for relief from his state court conviction. 
And, it is not unlikely that he alone will ever be afforded such relief. 
